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The Price of Ethics: 
Evidence from Socially Responsible Mutual Funds 
 
Abstract 
This  paper  estimates  the  price  of  ethics  by  studying  the  risk-return  relation  in  socially 
responsible investment (SRI) funds. Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI 
funds  in  many  European  and  Asia-Pacific  countries  strongly  underperform  domestic 
benchmark  portfolios  by  about  5%  per  annum,  although  UK  and  US  SRI  funds  do  not 
significantly underperform their benchmarks. The underperformance of SRI funds does not 
seem to be driven by the loadings on an ethical risk factor. SRI funds do not suffer a cost of 
reduced selectivity nor do SRI funds managers time the market. There is mixed evidence of a 
smart money effect: SRI investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the 
future, whereas they show some fund-selection ability in identifying ethical funds that will 
perform poorly. The screening activities of SRI funds have a significant impact on funds’ risk-
adjusted returns and loadings on risk factors: corporate governance and social screens generate 







“The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the 
good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else.” 
              -- Aristotle, written around 350 B.C.
1 
 
Although economics textbooks tell us that human behavior is driven by maximization of 
self-interest, many people deviate from exclusively selfish behavior (see, e.g., Fehr and Gachter, 
2000  and  2002).  For  example,  recent  experimental  evidence  indicates  that  altruism  or 
selflessness, is a powerful feature of human behavior and is unique to humans.
2 An individual’s 
utility partially depends on the utility of other members of the community, and ethical and social 
considerations  may  be  important  determinants  of  economic  behavior.
3  Economic  theories  of 
social  norms  (see  Akerlof,  1980,  and  Romer,  1984)  point  out  that,  even  when  individuals 
maximize  self-interest,  social  norms  that  are  financially  costly  to  the  individual  may 
nevertheless persist in the economy if individuals are sanctioned by loss of reputation when 
                                                 
1 The Nicomachean Ethics, Book I.5; in the translation by Ross (1980). 
2 Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) argue that human societies represent an anomaly in the animal world (): they are 
based on a detailed division of labor and cooperation between genetically unrelated individuals in large groups. 
3 In fact, economics was for a long time seen as a branch of ethics (see Sen, 1987). For example, Adam Smith was a 
Professor of Moral Philosophy.   
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disobeying the norm.
4 Using a repeated game framework, Bovenberg (2002) formalizes various 
roles of social norms and values in facilitating economic cooperation, and argues that social 
considerations of corporate stakeholders (including consumers, employees, shareholders, etc.) 
may induce corporations to care for public goods, like the natural environment, even though this 
does not yield a direct benefit to the stakeholders themselves.  
In  this  paper,  we  study  the  economic  effects  of  ethics  by  focusing  on  the  money-
management industry. Over the past decade, ethical mutual funds, or often also called socially 
responsible investment (SRI) funds, have experienced an explosive growth around the world: the 
assets in the socially screened portfolios reached $2.3 trillion in 2005 or approximately 9.4% of 
the total universe of professionally managed assets in the US (Social Investment Forum, 2005). 
SRI funds screen their investment portfolio based on ethical, social, corporate governance or 
environmental criteria. This provides an ideal setting to study the economic effects of ethics for 
the following reasons. First, investors of SRI funds explicitly deviate from the economically 
rational  goal  of  wealth-maximization.  SRI  investors  are  socially  conscious  and  derive  non-
financial utility by holding assets consistent with their ethical and social values. Second, by 
investing  in  mutual  funds  rather  than  giving  money  to  charity,  SRI  investors  still  desire  to 
improve their financial utility as they expect positive risk-adjusted returns on their investments. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we study the risk and 
return characteristics of SRI funds using a unique dataset consisting of nearly all SRI mutual 
funds  around  the  world  (the  United  States,  Europe,  Asia-Pacific  and  Africa).  To  our  best 
knowledge, this is the first study on the performance of SRI funds around the world. In order to 
pursue  social  objectives,  SRI  funds  employ  a  set  of  investment  screens  that  restrict  their 
investment opportunities. On the one hand, the exclusion of companies based on SRI screens 
may  constrain  the  risk-return  optimization  and  negatively  influence  fund  performance.  For 
instance, SRI funds typically do not invest in ‘sin’ stocks, i.e. public-traded companies involved 
in  producing  alcohol  or  tobacco  and  in  gambling,  although  these  stocks  have  historically 
outperformed the market (see Hong and Kacperczyk, 2005). On the other hand, the screening 
process of SRI funds may generate value-relevant non-public information and yield superior 
fund  performance.  The  SRI  screens  are  usually  also  used  as  filters  to  identify  managerial 
competence and superior corporate governance, or to avoid potential costs of corporate social 
crises and environmental disasters. Specifically, we examine whether or not the risk-adjusted 
                                                 
4 Elster (1989) provides a review of the literature on social norms and economic theory, and argues that self-interest 
does not provide a full explanation for adherence to social norms. Following Akerlof (1980), social norms are 
defined as acts whose utility to the agent depends on the beliefs or actions of other members of the community. 
Social values are preferences that value particular social norms (Bovenberg, 2002).     
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returns of the various types of SRI funds are different from those of conventional benchmarks.  
We add an ‘ethics factor’ to the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model and to the conditional 
models in which a lagged set of macro-economic variables are included. The cost of reduced 
diversification is captured by various measures of net selectivity of stocks. We also study how 
returns and risk evolves over time and whether SRI fund managers time the market.  
Second, we investigate whether or not ethical investors are able to select the SRI funds 
that will generate superior performance in subsequent periods (a smart money effect). Geczy, 
Stambaugh and Levin (2003) show that the fund selection process of SRI investors determines 
the performance of the SRI fund portfolios relative to that of conventional portfolios. While this 
study assumes that investors make fund selection decisions in a Bayesian way based on a fund’s 
past performance, expenses and turnover, a number of other financial and non-financial fund 
attributes may significantly influence SRI investors’ decision process (see Renneboog, Ter Horst 
and Zhang, 2006). We contribute to this line of research and examine the performance of SRI 
investors’  portfolios  by  tracking  the  actual  asset  allocation  decisions  of  investors  (i.e.  the 
decisions  to  invest  or  withdraw  money)  instead  of  making  assumptions  on  investors’  fund 
selection process. 
Third, we study the impact of SRI screens on fund returns and risk loadings, an issue that 
plays a central role in the SRI fund industry but has not yet been explored in the literature. More 
specifically, we analyze the question whether or not screening intensity and screening criteria 
(i.e. sin, ethical, social, corporate governance, and environmental screens) influence the risk-
adjusted returns and risk exposure of SRI funds. Simultaneously, we examine the impact of 
other fund characteristics, such as fund size, age, the fee structure and the reputation of fund 
families, on fund returns and risk.  
The paper yields many interesting conclusions on SRI mutual funds; we summarize the 
main findings: First, the risk-adjusted returns of the average SRI fund in the UK and US are not 
statistically different from those of non-SRI funds in these countries. In contrast, the average 
SRI fund in most European and Asia-Pacific countries strongly underperforms the benchmark 
portfolios. In particular, the risk-adjusted returns of the average SRI funds in Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden are on average lower than –5% per annum. 
These results may reflect the impact of ethical considerations on stock prices: firms meeting 
high ethical standards are overpriced by the market and investors in these companies pay a price 
for  ethics.  It  seems  that  investors  are  not  doing  that  well  by  doing  good.  In  addition,  we 
demonstrate that the explanatory power of the Fama-French-Carhart risk factors has increased 
significantly over time for SRI fund returns. This suggests that SRI funds gradually converge to  
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conventional funds by holding similar assets in their portfolios. When we extend the Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor model with an ethics factor, we confirm that the SRI funds have a 
higher exposure to this  ethics factor.  However,  the difference between  five-  and four-factor 
alphas  of  SRI  funds  is  economically  small.  In  terms  of  the  costs  of  diversification  (net 
selectivity), SRI and conventional funds are not significantly different.  
Second, we find mixed results on the ‘smart money’ effect in the SRI fund industry: 
although ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform their benchmarks 
in subsequent periods, there is some fund-selection ability to identify the ethical funds that will 
perform  poorly.  Meanwhile,  we  document  that  the  risk-adjusted  return  of  the  total  wealth 
invested in ethical funds in Europe (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World is about -6% per 
annum.   
Third, the performance of SRI funds increases with the number of SRI screens employed 
to model their investment universe, and is better when funds have an in-house SRI research team 
to  screen  their  portfolios.  A  two  standard-deviation  increase  in  the  SRI  screening  intensity 
generates 2.6% abnormal returns per annum. The use of corporate governance and social screens 
increases the alpha in a four-factor model by 2.1%. These results support the hypothesis that the 
screening process generates value-relevant non-public information, and SRI screens help fund 
managers to pick stocks. It also appears that screening activities of SRI funds have a significant 
impact on funds’ loadings on risk factors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data on SRI 
funds, investment screens and performance benchmarks. Section II presents the returns and risk 
characteristics of SRI funds and Section III focuses on the investors’ portfolios of SRI funds, 
more  specifically  the  smart  money  effect.  While  Section  IV  examines  the  determinants  of 
returns and risk of SRI funds, Section V concludes.  
 
I   SRI Funds, Investment Screens and Performance Benchmarks 
 
I.A Ethical and Conventional Mutual Funds  
 
We construct a database that contains socially responsible equity mutual funds domiciled 
in  23  countries  and  offshore  jurisdictions.  Specifically,  the  SRI  funds  are  domiciled  in  the 
following regions: (i) Europe (excluding the UK): Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Sweden,  and  Switzerland,  (ii)  the  UK,  including 
Guernsey and the Isle of Man, (iii) the US, and (iv) the Rest of the World: Australia, Canada,  
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Cayman Islands, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands Antilles, Singapore, and South Africa. We 
also collect data on conventional equity mutual funds in the UK and the US, which serve as our 
reference groups. Our primary data source is the Standard & Poors’ Fund Service (Micropal), 
which covers ethical funds and conventional UK funds. The US ethical and conventional fund 
data are obtained from the CRSP Survivor-bias Free Mutual Fund Database. We also obtain data 
for the Canadian SRI fund data from Bloomberg. For each fund, our database contains monthly 
Net Asset Value (per share value of a fund’s portfolio net of annual management fees, denoted 
as NAV), monthly Assets Under Management (AUM), and other fund characteristics such as the 
management fees, load fees and the inception date. Our sample period starts in January 1991 
(prior to this year the number of SRI mutual funds is tiny) and ends in December 2003.  
To determine the universe of SRI funds, we create a list of mutual funds which are 
labelled  as    ‘ethical’,  ‘socially  responsible’,  ‘ecology’,  ‘christian  values’  or  ‘islamic’  in  the 
databases  above  mentioned.  S&P  classifies  mutual  funds  as  ethical  or  socially  responsible 
investment funds if the fund managers specify in the fund prospectuses that they have social, 
environmental, corporate governance, or ethical investment goals. We subsequently verify the 
SRI screening policies of these funds. For each fund in our initial sample, we hand-collect the 
information on SRI screens using the fund prospectuses and websites, and also gather more 
information by direct contact with fund managers (by phone, by email or via on-site interviews). 
Furthermore, we also collect information on whether a fund engages in shareholder activism and 
whether the fund bases its screening activities on an in-house SRI research team. Hence, in order 
to be included in our sample, the SRI funds employ at least one ethical, corporate governance, 
social, or environmental screen as part of their investment policies.  
When a mutual fund is sold in two or more countries, the S&P list of socially responsible 
funds reports it as two or more funds. We exclude such double counting and also restrict our 
sample to equity mutual funds, excluding fixed-income, balanced, and money-market mutual 
funds. We also do not include funds that are not available to individual investors directly, but are 
only available through institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies, or charities and 
foundations.  The  above  filtering  process  reduces  our  sample  size  to  455  equity  SRI  funds, 
including 45 funds for which we do not have data on their assets under management. In addition, 
we learnt from discussions with several industry experts and fund managers that over our sample 
period eight socially responsible equity mutual funds ceased to exist, which implies a very low 
attrition rate (on average 0.25% on an annual basis). To avoid a possible survivorship bias (see 
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross, 1992), we collect data for these funds from a number of 
sources including CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database and the Datastream ‘dead’  
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mutual funds research files, and include the funds in our sample. All returns are inclusive of any 
distributions, net of annual management fees and denoted in local currency. Our final sample of 
SRI  funds  comprises  463  live  and  dead  equity  mutual  funds  domiciled  in  23  countries  or 
offshore jurisdictions around the world.  
Our benchmark sample of UK conventional funds consists of 716 non-SRI equity mutual 
funds, including 649 ‘live’ equity funds and 67 ‘dead’ equity funds (the attrition rate is about 3% 
on an annual basis). Data for dead mutual funds were collected from Datastream. The reference 
group of US conventional mutual funds consists of 12,624 equity funds over our sample period 
(including 8,813 funds alive in December 2003) and these data are collected from the CRSP 
Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database. Consistent with Bollen (2006), we classify a US 
fund as an equity fund if its year-end equity allocation reaches 75 percent or more during the 
fund’s life.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The cross-sectional characteristics of the SRI and non-SRI mutual funds are described by 
country
5  in  Table  1:  the  number  of  funds,  the  number  of  fund  families  (i.e.  the  financial 
institution that manages the mutual funds), the fund age, the assets under management, and the 
fees  (including  management  fees  and  load  fees
7)  per  fund  in  December  2003.  The  largest 
number of SRI funds in our sample comes from Continental Europe (with a total of 206 funds 
which are part of 110 different fund families), followed by the US (98 funds), the UK (67 
funds), and Australia (36 funds). The SRI fund industry of the UK and the US is the most 
mature  as  reflected  by  the  median  age  of  about  7  years,  whereas  the  industry  in  Europe 
                                                 
5 We identify a mutual fund’s nationality by its legal domicile. It should be noted that the domicile may be different 
from the countries where the funds are sold. For funds in the four offshore jurisdictions, the investors’ nationalities 
are unobservable.  Another extreme case is  Luxembourg,  whose  funds are sold across Europe. Fund  managers 
choose Luxembourg and offshore jurisdictions as funds’ domiciles mainly because of favorable tax laws. Based on 
the  countries  of  origin  of  the  fund  management  companies,  we  assign  41  out  of  the  56  funds  domiciled  in 
Luxembourg to: Switzerland (11 funds), Germany (10), UK (6), France (4), Netherlands (4), Belgium (3), Sweden 
(2),  and  Austria  (1).  The  remaining  15  funds  domiciled  in  Luxembourg  are  evaluated  using  European-wide 
benchmarks. 
6 We identify a mutual fund’s nationality by its legal domicile. It should be noted that the domicile may be different 
from the countries where the funds are sold. For funds in the four offshore jurisdictions, the investors’ nationalities 
are unobservable.  Another extreme case is  Luxembourg,  whose  funds are sold across Europe. Fund  managers 
choose Luxembourg and offshore jurisdictions as their domiciles mainly because of favorable tax laws. Based on 
the  countries  of  origin  of  their  fund  management  companies,  we  assign  41  out  of  the  56  funds  domiciled  in 
Luxembourg to: Switzerland (11 funds), Germany (10), UK (6), France (4), Netherlands (4), Belgium (3), Sweden 
(2),  and  Austria  (1).  The  remaining  15  funds  domiciled  in  Luxembourg  are  evaluated  using  European-wide 
benchmarks. 
7 Load fees include front-end fees (share subscription fees) and back-end fees (share redemption fees). While load 
fees are mainly used to pay for trading costs and marketing expenses (e.g. distribution payments to brokers or for 
advertising), management fees are used to cover operating expenses including managerial compensation as well as 
part of the marketing expenses (called the 12B1 fee in the US).  
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(excluding the UK) and the Rest of the World is young with a median age of about 3 years since 
the fund’s inception. Furthermore, US and UK SRI funds are much larger than those in Europe 
and the Rest of the World. For instance, while the average size of SRI funds in the US is ￿ 142 
million, the one in Europe (excluding the UK) amounts to ￿ 32 million. The total fees (the sum 
of the annual management fees and one seventh of the load fees
8) range from 1.3% per annum in 
Belgium and the Netherlands to 2.4% per annum in Malaysia. There are important differences in 
the  components  of  fund  fees  across  the  regions:  European  and  UK  funds  have  the  lowest 
management  fees  (1.3%),  whereas  the  load  fees,  i.e.  the  sum  of  front-end  loads  (share 
subscription fees) and back-end loads (share redemption fees), are the lowest in the US (1.8%). 
Finally, Panel B of Table 1 shows that the conventional funds are typically much larger, with an 
average fund size of ￿ 270 million and ￿ 289 million for the UK or the US, respectively. While 
an SRI fund family consists on average of two SRI equity funds, the average number of non-SRI 
equity funds per family is five funds in the UK and 18 in the US. 
 
I.B   Social and Ethical Objectives 
 
The SRI funds usually employ a combination of negative or positive SRI screens in the 
process of constructing portfolios. A typical negative screen is applied to an initial asset pool, 
such as the S&P 500 stocks from which specific sectors (e.g.  alcohol,  tobacco  and defense 
industries), are excluded. Positive screens are employed to select companies meeting superior 
standards  on  issues  such  as  corporate  governance  or  environmental  protection.  The  use  of 
positive screens is often combined with a ‘best in class’ approach: firms are ranked within each 
industry based on social criteria; subsequently, only those firms passing a minimum threshold in 
each industry are selected as potential candidates for inclusion into a portfolio. For instance, the 
chemical firms polluting least are selected as candidates for SRI portfolios. Moreover, in order 
to achieve social objectives, SRI funds sometimes engage in shareholder activism, where fund 
managers  attempt  to  influence  the  company’s  actions  through  direct  dialogue  with  the 
management or by voting at annual general meetings.
9 
                                                 
8 We amortize load fees over a seven-year holding period, which is the average holding period for equity mutual 
funds. Like Sirri and Tufano (1998), Total Fees is the sum of the management fees and the load fees charged to 
investors. Note that the true costs of investing in mutual funds may be higher than the total fees due to taxes on 
investment returns. 
9 For a clinical study of shareholder activism, see Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2006).   
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We develop a list of SRI screens used by SRI funds around the world. Combining the 
information from a variety of data sources
10, we identify 21 screening criteria, which are further 
classified into four major categories. As reported in Panel A of Table 2, the first  category, 
denoted as ‘Sin’, contains funds that avoid investing in firms from the so-called ‘sin-industries’, 
which produce e.g. tobacco, alcohol, or weapons. The funds in the ‘Ethical’ category exclude 
e.g. firms that test their products on animals, produce equipment facilitating abortion, develop 
genetically-modified products, or violate islamic or  christian religious principals. Funds that 
employ  screens  checking  for  superior  corporate  governance,  good  labor  relations  or  a  good 
human  rights  track  record  (e.g.  no  child  labor)  are  denoted  as  ‘Corporate  Governance  and 
Social’ funds. Finally, funds that invest in environmentally  friendly firms are referred to as 
‘Environmental’ funds. Note that an SRI fund usually employs a combination of screens from 
several  categories.  For  instance,  the  TIAA-CREF  Social  Choice  Equity  Fund  excludes 
companies that derive revenues from alcohol, tobacco, gambling or weapons, and invests in 
companies meeting high standards in labor relations, corporate governance, and environmental 
performance.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Panel  B  of  Table  2  highlights  the  differences  in  screening  activities  across  the  four 
regions. The UK SRI funds employ on average 9.5 investment screens simultaneously, 6 of 
which are so-called negative screens which exclude firms or industries with undesirable ethical 
characteristics. In contrast, SRI funds in the Rest of the World apply on average 5.5 screens. 
93% of US SRI funds use at least one of the sin screens, whereas corporate governance, social 
and environmental screens are more popular in the UK and the rest of Europe (used by 87% and 
92% of the funds, respectively). Islamic funds account for 36% of SRI funds in the Rest of the 
World, including Asia-Pacific and Africa. Interestingly, 47% of the US SRI funds report that 
they make active use of their shareholder voting rights, while in Europe (excluding the UK) only 
18% of the funds are involved in shareholder activism. Furthermore, 55% of the US SRI funds 
base their SRI screening activities on in-house research, compared to only 11% of SRI funds in 
the Rest of the World. Finally, European SRI funds are the most internationally diversified ones: 
33% of the funds invest across Europe, 61% invest around the world and only 6% invest in the 
domestic country. In contrast, only 16% of the SRI funds in the US invest overseas. 
 
                                                 
10  Our  information  sources  are  Social  Investment  Forum  (2003),  Natural  Capital  Institute 
(www.responsibleinvesting.org),  SiRi  SRI  Fund  Service  (www.avanzi-sri.org),  and  Sustainable  Investment 
Platform (www.sustainable-investment.org).   
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I.C Benchmarks  
 
We construct monthly returns of benchmark portfolios for each country and region in our 
sample. The benchmark factors are the Fama and French’s (1993) three factors, including the 
market, size, and book-to-market, and the Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. We collect the 
four factors for the US from the CRSP database. As risk-free interest rates, we use the 1-month 
treasury-bill rate or the inter-bank interest rate, gathered from CRSP and Datastream. Given that 
the factor returns for countries other than the US are not publicly available, we construct the 
factors for all other countries and regions in our sample using the Worldscope database
11. For 
the excess market return factor (MKT) we use the return of a value-weighted portfolio of all 
stocks  (including  live  and  dead  companies)  in  the  Worldscope  database  in  each  country  or 
region minus the risk-free rate.
13 The size factor SMB (Small minus Big) is the return difference 
between portfolios of small and large stocks. In line with Fama and French (1993), we rank all 
stocks in a country or region based on the market value and assign the stocks with a total market 
capitalization below the median to the small stock portfolio and the ones with a market cap 
above the median to the large stock portfolio. To construct the book-to-market factor HML 
(High minus Low), we rank all stocks in the Worldscope database based on their book-to-market 
ratios, and assign the top 30% to the high book-to-market portfolio and the bottom 30% to the 
low book-to-market portfolio. The HML factor return is the return difference between the high 
and low book-to-market portfolios. To form the momentum factor UMD (Up minus Down), we 
rank all stocks according to their returns over the prior 12 months, and assign the top 30% stocks 
to the high prior return portfolio and the bottom 30% to the low prior return portfolio. The return 
difference between the high and low prior return portfolios is the UMD factor return. All of the 
three factors SMB, HML and UMD are value-weighted and constructed using 1-month lagged 
information. Following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), the SMB and HML factors 
are rebalanced at the end of June of each year, and the UMD factor is rebalanced at the end of 
each month.  
To check the accuracy of our factor returns, we compare our UK factors with those in 
Dimson, Nagel and Quigley (2003) who construct the UK factors for the period of 1995-2001 
                                                 
11 For the construction of the factor portfolios, we used the on-line research tool provided by Style Research Ltd., 
London. 
12 We also used the MSCI country indices as a proxy for the market portfolio, and our results remain unchanged. 
The Worldscope database aims at covering about 98% of market capitalization in each country, while the MSCI 
indices target 85% of free-floated market capitalization.  
13 When we use the MSCI country indices as a proxy for the market portfolio, our results remain unchanged. The 
Worldscope database aims at covering about 98% of market capitalization in each country, while the MSCI indices 
target 85% of free-floated market capitalization.   
  10
using the London Share Price Database (LSPD)
14. We also construct the US factors using the 
Worldscope database and compare it with the Fama and French factors in the CRSP database. 
We find that our own factors are virtually identical to those from these other sources. 
 
II  Returns and Risk  
 
II.A  Doing Well by Doing Good? 
 
In order to investigate whether or not investors (literally) pay a price for their ethical and 
social considerations, we examine the risk and return characteristics of SRI mutual funds around 
the world and compare this to reference groups of conventional US and UK funds. Most existing 
research  on  SRI  fund  performance  does  not  find  evidence  for  the  hypothesis  that  the  risk-
adjusted returns of the average SRI mutual funds differ significantly from those of the average 
non-SRI  mutual  funds.
15  In  a  model  that  considers  the  stock  price  implications  of  ethical 
investing that excludes polluting companies, Heinkel, Krause and Zechner (2001) show that the 
exclusion of polluting firms (or other unethical firms) by ethical investors reduces risk-sharing 
opportunities  among  investors  who  hold  shares  of  polluting  firms,  which  may  negatively 
influence the stock price of polluting firms and raise their expected returns.
16 In line with this 
prediction, Hong and Kacperczyk (2005) find that ‘sin’ stocks in the US have been significantly 
underpriced by the stock market. The authors argue that the mispricing of ‘sin’ stocks may result 
from the fact that they are neglected by an important part of investors, i.e. the SRI investors.
17 
As a result, excluding this underpriced ‘sin’ part of the stock market (which most of the ethical 
funds do), may negatively influence the risk-return tradeoffs of SRI funds in comparison to 
conventional funds. 
                                                 
14 We thank Elroy Dimson and Stefan Nagel for providing us with the UK factor data.   
15 Almost all existing studies on SRI fund performance focus on individual countries (mainly the US and the UK). 
For instance, Goldreyer et al. (1999), Hamilton et al. (1993) and Statman (2000), Geczy et al. (2003), Bello (2005) 
and Girard et al. (2005) study US SRI funds; Luther et al. (1992), Luther and Matatko (1994), Mallin et al. (1995) 
and Gregory et al. (1997) examine UK SRI funds; Bauer, Derwall and Otten (2006) study Canadian SRI funds; and 
Bauer,  Otten  and  Tourani  Rad  (2006)  analyze  Australian  SRI  funds.  Multi-country  studies  are  undertaken  by 
Schroder (2003) for the US, Germany and Swiss SRI funds; Bauer et al. (2005) for the US, UK and German funds, 
and Kreander et al. (2005) for European funds. As most of these studies are based on different sample periods, 
benchmarks and methodologies, international comparisons are difficult to make. 
16 Implicit in this model is that there is limited arbitrage in the stock market, e.g. there is not enough arbitrage 
capital  exploiting  the  mispricing  between  polluting  firms  and  non-polluting  firms.  This  model  is  in  line  with 
Merton’s (1987) prediction that stocks with a smaller investor base (labeled as ‘neglected’ stocks) have a larger 
expected return due to limited risk-sharing.  
17  The  alternative  explanation  for  the  outperformance  of  ‘sin’  stocks  is  that  sin  companies  are  more  liable  to 
lawsuits (e.g. tobacco companies) and have higher expected return because of litigation risk.  
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We study the performance of ethical funds by using the time-series returns of an equally 
weighted portfolio of ethical funds.
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where  t r  is the return of an equally weighted portfolio of funds in month t,  t f r ,  is the return on a 
local risk-free deposit (i.e. the 1-month treasury bill rate or the inter-bank interest rate), 
m
t r  is the 
return of a local equity market index,  1 a  is Jensen’s alpha introduced by Jensen (1968),  MKT b is 
the factor loading on the market portfolio, and  t e  stands for the idiosyncratic return. We also 
estimate a four-factor model including the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors 
(see, Fama and French, 1993, and Carhart, 1997):  
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t r , 
hml
t r , and
umd
t r  are the SMB, HML and UMD factors,  4 a  is the four-factor-adjusted 
return of ethical fund portfolios,  MKT b , 
SMB b ,  HML b , and 
UMD b  are the factor loadings on the four 
factors, and  t e  stands for the idiosyncratic return.  
In order to control for the impact of fund fees on fund performance, we compute the 
alphas of fund portfolios both after and before deducting management fees (denoted as ￿4, and 
gross  ￿4  respectively).  The  gross  alpha  is  calculated  by  adding  back  one  twelfth  of  annual 
management fees to the monthly fund returns before estimating the four-factor model.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
                                                 
18  We  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  fund  portfolios  on  a  country  and  regional  basis  from  a  local  investor 
perspective: the country portfolios of mutual funds are in local currency, evaluated against local benchmark factors 
while using local risk-free interest rates. In addition, the portfolios ‘Europe excluding UK’ and ‘Rest of World’ are 
in Euro and US dollar and are evaluated against European and Asia-Pacific benchmark factors and the German and 
Australian risk-free rates, respectively. The ‘World’ portfolios are appraised from the perspective of an international 
investor based in the US: these portfolios are in US dollars and they are evaluated using the World benchmark 
factors and the US risk-free rate. As a robustness check, we also assess fund performance from the perspective of an 
international investor by using international indices as benchmarks; our main results remain unchanged (tables are 
available upon request). 
19 As a robustness check, we also estimate the models using a fund regression approach: we compute the cross-
sectional mean of individual fund estimates. These results are similar to the results from the portfolio regression 
approach presented in our paper. For example, using the fund regression approach, we find that the estimated four-
factor alphas of conventional UK and US funds are –0.9% and –2.4% per annum, respectively.  
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Panel A of Table 3 presents the excess returns (i.e. fund returns in excess of the risk-free 
rate) and the CAPM results for equally weighted portfolios of ethical and conventional funds. 
The average excess return of SRI funds around the world is 2.6% per annum (in USD), ranging 
from –0.7% per annum in the Rest of World to 5.2% per annum in the US. After controlling for 
the exposure to the market risk, the average SRI funds in the UK, the US and Continental 
Europe underperform local equity indices by 2.7%, 2.8%, and 4.3% per annum, respectively. 
However, the alphas for the UK and US SRI funds are not statistically different from those of 
their conventional peers, a result consistent with previous studies on SRI performance (see, e.g., 
Bauer, Koedijk and Otten, 2005).  
The estimation results for the four-factor model are presented in Panels B (regional level) 
and C (country level) of Table 3. The annual alphas of SRI funds in the UK and US are –2.2% 
and –3.4% respectively (both significant at the 1% level), whereas those of conventional funds 
are –1.1% and –2.5% respectively.
 20 The differences in alphas, about 1% per annum, are not 
statistically significant. It is also important to note that 97% of the return variations of the UK 
and  US  SRI  funds  can  be  replicated  by  portfolios  mimicking  the  four  risk  factors,  which 
suggests that the holdings of SRI funds in these two countries might be very similar to those of 
conventional  funds  tracking  style  indices.  European  SRI  funds  underperform  the  four-factor 
benchmarks by 3.5% per annum (significant at the 10% level), which is less negative than the 
CAPM-adjusted alpha due to the negative loading on the ‘HML’ factor. Furthermore, the US 
SRI funds have a significantly smaller exposure to the size (‘SMB’) factor than the conventional 
funds. This implies that these SRI funds invest relatively more in large-capitalization stocks. In 
contrast, the SRI funds in other countries feature a ‘small-cap growth stocks’ investment style.
21  
Panel C of Table 3 reports the performance of SRI funds at the country level from a 
domestic investor’s perspective. The results are shown for countries with at least 5 years of 
return  data.  The  four-factor  alphas  of  most  country  portfolios  are  strongly  negative,  which 
indicates the strong underperformance of European and Asia-Pacific SRI funds relative to the 
four-factor benchmarks. For example, the alphas of the average SRI funds in Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden are lower than –5% per annum.  
As  the  underperformance  of  actively  managed  conventional  funds  may  be  due  to 
management  fees  (see  Gruber,  1996,  and  Wermers,  2000),  we  examine  the  impact  of 
management  fees  on  SRI  fund  performance.  Panel  C  of  Table  3  shows  that,  even  before 
                                                 
20 Bollen (2006), who adopts a similar definition of equity funds, reports that the four-factor alpha for the average 
conventional US funds is -25 basis points per month, i.e. –3% per annum, which is similar to our estimates.  
21 A similar pattern of differences in investment styles between the US and European SRI funds are reported in 
Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005).  
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deducting management fees from fund returns, about half of the country portfolios underperform 
the benchmarks by more than 3% per annum. This implies that the management fees cannot 
fully explain the strong underperformance of European and Asia-Pacific SRI funds relative to 
domestic benchmark portfolios. 
To the extent that SRI funds invest in companies that are considered ‘ethical’, our results 
suggest that the companies meeting high ethical standards might be overpriced in stock markets, 
especially  in  Europe  (excluding  the  UK)  and  Asia-Pacific.
22  There  are  two  potential 
explanations for the ‘overpricing of ethics’ anomaly. The first is that ethical companies may be 
less risky than conventional ones and hence should earn a lower return. For instance, ethical 
companies may face fewer lawsuits relating to corporate governance scandals, corporate social 
crises and environmental disasters. In case the conventional four-factor pricing model does not 
capture SRI (or ‘ethical’) risks, the estimated alpha may reflect the expected returns associated 
with the missing risk factor. An alternative explanation for the overpricing of ethics may result 
from ‘aversion to unethical/asocial corporate behavior’: investors strongly dislike companies’ 
unethical behavior due to social norms even if the behavior is not associated with higher risks. 
When  deriving  non-financial  utility  from  investing  in  companies  that  meet  high  ethical 
standards,  SRI  investors  may  be  content  with  a  lower  rate  of  return  from  ethical/socially 
responsible firms. The rising demand from shares of SRI firms may cause these firms to be 
priced above their fundamental value such that ethical funds underperform the market.
23 This 
explanation  is  a  behavioral  one,  which  assumes  that  there  are  limits  to  arbitrage  in  stock 
markets, i.e. there are not enough arbitrageurs short-selling ethical firms if they are overpriced.  
 
II.B  Does Ethical Risk Matter? 
 
We  investigate  the  relative  importance  of  ‘ethical  risk’  and  ‘aversion  to  unethical 
behavior’ to explain the underperformance of ethical funds. If underperformance is driven by the 
missing ethical risk factor, adding this factor to the four-factor model could improve the alphas 
of ethical funds.  
                                                 
22 Alternative explanations for the underperformance of SRI funds may be transaction costs and non-stock holdings 
of  funds.  Wermers  (2000)  shows  that,  for  conventional  mutual  funds  in  the  US,  transaction  costs  and  the 
underperformance of non-stock holdings lead to a reduction in fund performance by 0.8% and 0.7% per annum 
respectively. Given that the gross alphas on SRI funds are far lower than –1.5%, these two factors are unlikely to 
explain the strong underperformance of SRI funds. 
23 This view is related to taste-based theories of discrimination in labor markets, which originates from Becker 
(1957). In this theory, employers with discriminatory tastes are willing to pay a financial price to avoid interacting 
with a particular class of people. Consequently the wage of a particular class of people (e.g. white people) may be 
higher than the wage of others. The ‘aversion to unethical behavior’ explanation is also in line with the fact that in 
product markets, consumers are willing to pay a premium for environmentally friendly products.  
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We measure the ‘ethics’ factor returns by employing ethical equity indices, i.e. the FTSE 
4 Good (FTSE4G) Indices in excess of the risk-free interest rate.
24 In order to be included in the 
FTSE4G indices, companies must pass the negative screens (such as e.g. tobacco, weapons and 
nuclear)  and  satisfy  the  positive  selection  screens  (such  as  environmental  sustainability, 
corporate governance, stakeholder relationships or universal human rights). We use the excess 
returns of the UK, US, Europe and Global indices from the FTSE4G, which represent the returns 
of zero-investment passive portfolios of ethical firms. Panel A of Table 4 reports the four-factor-
adjusted returns of the passive ethical portfolios of the four regions. We find that portfolios of 
ethical firms in the UK and Europe underperform their local benchmarks by about 4.5% per 
annum, consistent with the results for ethical mutual funds. As ethical indices are in fact passive 
portfolios  without  any  transaction  costs  and  do  not  comprise  non-stock  holdings,  the  result 
supports the view that the underperformance of ethical funds is driven by neither management 
fees, transaction costs nor non-stock holdings. Meanwhile, the risk-adjusted returns of the US 
and the World ethical indices are not statistically different from zero. 
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where  5 a  is the five-factor-adjusted return of mutual fund portfolios, 
ethic
t r  captures the excess 
return of the regional ethical indices,
26  ETHIC b  is the loading on the ethical risk factor, and  t e  
stands for the idiosyncratic return. We can also interpret 
ethic
t r  as a zero-investment spread that 
has a long position in ethical firms and a short position in a risk-free deposit. 
 Panel B of Table 4 presents the estimation results for Eq. (3). First, as expected, ethical 
funds in Europe (ex. the UK), the Rest of World, and the World have significantly positive 
loadings  on  the  ‘ethics’  factor.  The  UK  and  US  ethical  funds  have  a  significantly  higher 
exposure to the ‘ethics’ factor than conventional funds. Second, the five-factor-adjusted alphas 
of the UK and US ethical funds are 1.1% and 0.5% higher per annum than those of conventional 
                                                 
24 The FTSE4Good Indices were launched in July 2001 with a history dating back to 1996. They are value-weighted 
and include companies from the FTSE All-World Developed Index. As a robustness check, we also use the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI) as an alternative to the FTSE4Good indices and obtain very similar results 
(tables are available upon request). The DJSI indices capture the leading 10% companies by industry in terms of 
sustainability  and  are  drawn  from  the  largest  2500  companies  in  the  Dow  Jones  Global  Index.  Unlike  the 
FTSE4Good indices, the DJSI does not provide indices specific to the UK and US.  
25 Our model is in line with Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2002) framework of mutual fund performance evaluation, 
where fund performance benchmarks include seemingly unrelated assets that are not captured by the benchmarks.   
26 As the FTSE4G does not provide ethical indices for the Asia-Pacific region, we use excess returns of the FTSE4G 
Global Index as a proxy for the ‘ethics’ factor in the Rest of World.   
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funds, although the differences are not statistically significant. Third and most importantly, the 
difference between the five- and four-factor alphas of SRI funds is economically small, which is 
less than 0.5% per annum for ethical funds in the UK, US, Europe and the World. Given that 
ethical  funds  underperform  the  four-factor  portfolios  by  more  than  5%  per  annum  in  many 
countries, it implies that adding the ‘ethics’ risk factor to the four-factor model has only limited 
influence on the risk-adjusted returns of ethical funds. Consequently the underperformance of 
ethical funds seems not to be driven by ethical risk. These results support the hypothesis that 
investors pay a price for ethics due to ‘aversion to unethical behavior’, as ethical fund returns are 
much lower than what is required to compensate for risk.  
 
II.C  How Do Returns and Risk Evolve Over Time? 
 
The SRI fund industry is a relatively young industry, as the average age of SRI funds in 
our sample is only 6 years (see Table 1). The industry may have experienced a learning phase 
during the early period of its development. Bauer et al. (2005) document that in early 1990’s US 
and German SRI funds significantly underperform their conventional peers but this difference is 
gradually transformed into a slight out-performance during the late 1990’s. In this subsection, 
we examine the evolution of SRI funds’ returns and risk over time.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
We divide our sample period into three sub-samples: the pre-bubble period of 1991-
1995, the internet bubble period of 1996-1999, and the post-bubble period of 2000-2003. We 
estimate the  four-factor  model (Eq.  (2)) for the three sub-samples, and report the  estimated 
alphas and the adjusted R-squared of the model in Panels A of Table 5. Consistent with Bauer et 
al. (2005), the US ethical funds underperform their conventional peers in the pre-bubble period 
by 2.9% per annum (statistically significant at the 1% level) and catch up with conventional 
funds during the post-bubble period. However, in contrast to the US SRI funds, ethical funds in 
the UK, Europe and the Rest of World do not exhibit such a (learning) effect. Meanwhile, the 
World average portfolio of ethical funds shows some improvement in performance, as its annual 
alpha increases from –2.9% before the bubble period to –1% after the bubble. Furthermore, the 
explanatory  power  of  the  four  risk  factors  in  Europe  and  the  Rest  of  World  has  increased 
significantly. The R-squared of European SRI funds has risen from 63% in early 1990’s to 87% 
in early 2000’s. For the World average ethical portfolio, the R-squared increased from 80% to 
97% during the past decade.  
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The fact that a higher fraction of the return variation of ethical funds can be replicated by 
the  well-known  risk  factors  over  the  past  decade,  may  indicate  that  SRI  funds  gradually 
converge to conventional funds by holding similar assets in their portfolios (or that conventional 
funds become more ethical). To investigate this hypothesis further, we directly compare the risk-
return characteristics of an equally weighted portfolio of SRI funds and an equally weighted 
portfolio  of  conventional  funds  (representing  ethical  and  conventional  investment  styles, 
respectively). If SRI funds converge to conventional funds, we should observe that conventional 
investment  styles  have  increasing  explanatory  power  for  the  return  variations  of  ethical 











t r  (
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t r ) is the return of an equally weighted portfolio of ethical (conventional) funds 
in  the  UK  or  the  US,  a   is  the  average  tracking  error  of  ethical  fund  returns  relative  to 
conventional  fund  returns,  and  t e   is  the  idiosyncratic  return  of  ethical  funds  relative  to 
conventional funds.  
Panel B of Table 5 reports the estimated alphas and the adjusted R-squared of Eq. (4) for 
the three time periods. First, the estimated alphas for the UK and US SRI funds are negative, 
indicating that the ethical portfolios have lower expected returns and higher risk than ￿ units of 
the conventional portfolios. In other words, ethical portfolios have a lower Sharpe ratio and are 
less mean-variance efficient than conventional portfolios. During both the pre- and post-bubble 
periods, US ethical portfolios experience significantly worse risk-return tradeoffs than their US 
conventional counterparts. Second, over the past decade, a higher fraction of the ethical portfolio 
returns can be explained by the conventional style than before. From the early 1990’s to the 
early 2000’s, the adjusted R-squared rises from 80% to 90% for the UK and from 92% to 97% 
for the US.
27 These results support the hypothesis that the holdings of ethical funds become 
increasingly similar to those of conventional funds. 
 
II.D  Time-Varying Risk Loadings and Market Timing  
 
So far, we have assumed that the risk loadings of SRI funds do not change systematically 
over time, i.e. the portfolio betas are not time-varying. However, fund managers may decide to 
                                                 
27 The volatility of the idiosyncratic returns of SRI funds remains stable over this period (tables are available upon 
request). This suggests that the rise in the R-squared is not driven by a decline in idiosyncratic risk.  
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vary  the  risk  exposure  of  their  portfolios  under  different  macroeconomic  conditions. 
Furthermore, if fund managers have some ‘market timing’ abilities and hence some predictive 
power regarding the stock market evolution, they may increase funds’ exposure to the stock 
market  prior  to  a  market  increase  and  reduce  the  exposure  prior  to  a  market  decline.  We 
therefore investigate the impact of time-varying risk loadings on the risk-adjusted returns of SRI 
funds, and thus examine market timing. 
We employ a conditional model as introduced by Ferson and Schadt (1996) and assume 
that fund managers change the portfolio risk loadings as a rational response to publicly available 
macroeconomic  information.  By  incorporating  a  lagged  information  set  of  macroeconomic 
variables  in  the  four-  and  five-factor  models  (Eq.  (2)  and  (3)),  we  estimate  the  following 
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where  1 - t z is a vector of four predetermined information variables, and  b F, b  is a vector of four 
response  coefficients  where  F  stands  for  MKT,  SMB,  HML  or  UMD.  The  predetermined 
information variables which have shown to be good predictors of stock returns (according to 
Ferson and Schadt, 1996) include: (i) the one-month inter-bank interest rate or the treasury bill 
rate,  (ii) the dividend  yield of the value-weighted local market indices, (iii) the bond term-
structure  premium  measured  by  the  ten-year  government  bond  yield  minus  the  one-month 
treasury bill rate, and (iv) the bond credit-risk premium measured by the corporate bond yield 
minus the ten-year government bond yield (or, for the US, the Moody’s BAA rated bond yield 
minus the Moody’s AAA rated bond yield). These information variables for each country are 
obtained  from  Datastream  and  are  lagged  by  one  month.
28  In  this  model,  the  time-varying 
portfolio risk loading ( t F, b ) is a linear combination of a time-constant beta ( a F, b ) and time-
varying  betas  ( 1 , ' - t b F z b ):  t F, b = 1 , , ' - + t b F a F z b b ,  where  both  b F, b   and  1 - t z are  four-  or  five-
dimensional  row  vectors  and  consequently t F, b is  a  scalar.  The  benchmark  portfolio  in  the 
                                                 
28 To evaluate the performance of mutual fund portfolios, we use local information variables for the UK and the US 
portfolios, German and Australian instruments for Europe and the Rest of World portfolios, and the US instruments 
for the World portfolios.  
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conditional model can also be interpreted as a dynamic portfolio where portfolio weights are 
updated  mechanically  following  the  release  of  macroeconomic  information.  For  instance, 
) ( , 1 t f
m
t t r r z - -  is the excess return of investing  1 - t z units in the market portfolio at period t. 
If a mutual fund manager increases the fund’s exposure to the market prior to a market 
increase  or  reduces  the  market  exposure  prior  to  a  market  decline,  the  fund’s  returns  are  a 
convex function of the market returns. To test this market-timing ability of the managers of SRI 
funds, we employ the Treynor and Mazuy’s (1966) measure by adding a quadratic term of the 
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where the coefficient on the quadratic term ( TM g ) measures a fund manager’s market-timing 
ability based on private information. A positive  TM g implies that the fund’s returns are a convex 
function of the market returns even after controlling for time-varying risk loadings based on 
publicly available macroeconomic information. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Panel A of Table 6 reports estimation results for the conditional four- and five-factor 
alphas  ( C , 4 a   and  C , 5 a )  and  the  market-timing  coefficient  ( TM g ).  First,  we  find  that  the 
conditional four- or five-factor alphas across all regions are very similar to the alphas of the 
unconditional models (of Table 3, Panel B and Table 4, Panel B). This implies that allowing for 
time-varying  risk  loadings  has  little  impact  on  our  results  on  SRI  fund  performance.  An 
interesting difference with the unconditional results is that the four-factor conditional alpha of 
SRI  funds  in  the  US  is  lower  than  those  of  conventional  US  funds  by  1.6%  per  annum 
(significant at the 10% level). Second, there is little evidence that SRI fund managers in the UK, 
US and Continental Europe have some market timing ability, a result that is consistent with most 
studies on conventional mutual funds.
29 In addition, we find that SRI fund managers in the Rest 
of World exhibit significantly negative ‘market timing’ ability, which implies that they time the 
market in the wrong direction.  
 
II.E  Is Inadequate Diversification of Risk Costly? 
                                                 
29 Bollen and Busse (2001) show that market-timing tests on daily returns are more powerful than on monthly 
returns, and that US mutual funds exhibit significant timing ability (on a daily frequency).  
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Active portfolio management may imply that by actively selecting securities that are 
undervalued, portfolio managers give up part of the diversification potential of their portfolios. 
Investors in actively managed funds bear more idiosyncratic risk relative to investors in passive 
assets such as market portfolios. Compared to conventional funds, SRI funds face an additional 
set of constraints on their investment opportunities: the SRI screens. We therefore study whether 
or  not  the  SRI  screening  activities  bring  about  a  cost  to  investors  in  terms  of  reduced 
diversification of idiosyncratic risk. 
We measure the welfare costs of inadequate diversification by investors’ opportunity 
costs of bearing idiosyncratic risk using the following two specifications. First, following Fama 
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where s is the standard deviation of the portfolio excess returns,  MKT b is the portfolio’s market 
beta estimated by Eq. (1),  t f
m
t r r , -  is the market excess return, and  m s is the standard deviation 
of the market excess returns. As Div1 equals the idiosyncratic part of portfolio return volatility 
) ( m MKTs b s -  multiplied by the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, the cost of inadequate 
diversification is the additional expected return that would just compensate the investor for the 
diversifiable asset dispersion chosen by the fund manager.  










s s ) ( , 4 - =               (9) 
 
where  s is  the  standard  deviation  of  portfolio  excess  returns, 
b
t r is  the  return  of  a  zero-
investment portfolio  consisting of the four benchmark assets with factor loadings resulting from 
regressing  excess  fund  returns  on  factor  returns 
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b
t r . 
Similar  to  the  first  specification,  the  cost  of  inadequate  diversification  (Div4)  equals  the 
idiosyncratic part of portfolio return volatility  ) ( b s s -  times the Sharpe ratio of the four-factor 
benchmark portfolio.  
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  In case SRI fund investors bear more idiosyncratic risk than conventional fund investors 
(e.g. due to SRI screens), SRI investors may require an additional return to compensate the 
opportunity costs of bearing idiosyncratic risk. We calculate the Fama’s (1972) measure of fund 
performance by subtracting the welfare costs of inadequate diversification from the funds’ risk-
adjusted returns, which is labeled as ‘Net Selectivity’ (NS). More specifically, Net Selectivity is 
defined as the funds’ risk-adjusted returns (i.e. the sum of the alpha and idiosyncratic returns, 
denoted as  t e a + ) in excess of the welfare costs of bearing idiosyncratic risk (Div). The NS has 
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It  is  straightforward  to  see  that  the  Net  Selectivity  also  equals  the  portfolio  excess  return 
( t f t r r , - ) minus the risk premium for s  units of portfolio risk. 
Panel  B  of  Table  6  shows  the  estimation  results  for  both  the  original  Fama’s 
specification and the extended specification of net selectivity. The welfare costs of inadequate 
diversification (Div) relative to either the one-factor or four-factor benchmarks are economically 
small (i.e. between 0.1% and 0.5% per annum) for ethical funds across the regions, and they are 
not statistically significant (except in the US). The differences in diversification costs between 
ethical funds and conventional funds are also not statistically significant for the UK and US. 
Furthermore, after adjusting for the opportunity costs of taking avoidable risk, the performance 
measures of net selectivity are similar to our previous results of one-factor and four-factor alphas 
(see Table 3). The differences in net selectivity between ethical funds and conventional funds 
are not statistically significant. These results suggest that the SRI screening activities do not 
impose welfare costs to investors in terms of inadequate risk diversification. This is consistent 
with  the  classic  view  that  a  well-diversified  portfolio  does  not  require  a  large  number  of 
stocks
30,  and  implies  that  SRI  constraints  have  little  influence  on  the  diversification  of 
idiosyncratic risk.  
 
III  Is There A ‘Smart Money’ Effect?  
 
                                                 
30 A number of studies show that 5 to 30 stocks are needed to make a well-diversified portfolio (see, e.g. Evans and 
Archer, 1968, Statman, 1987, and Brennan and Torous, 1999).).                   
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The  performance  of  the  average  SRI  fund  is  not  necessarily  useful  information  for 
investors who can selectively invest in a subset of SRI funds. Previous studies document a 
‘smart money’ effect in the conventional mutual fund industry as investors seem to be able to 
make  smart  decisions  by  selecting  ex  ante  the  mutual  funds  that  will  turn  out  to  be 
outperformers (see e.g., Gruber, 1996, and Zheng, 1999). In other words, even though active 
portfolio management on average may not add value, money may be smart in selecting the 
funds that will perform well in the future.
31 We therefore study whether or not such a smart 
money effect exists in the ethical fund industry.  
The  fund  selection  process  of  ethical  investors  determines  the  performance  of  the 
selected SRI funds relative to a conventional fund portfolio. For instance, Geczy, Stambaugh 
and Levin (2003) show that, for an investor who believes that stock returns are generated by the 
four-factor model, the SRI mutual funds that she selects underperform the non-SRI funds by 
3.6%  per  annum.  In  contrast,  ethical  investors  who  believe  in  managerial  skill  pay  a  large 
financial cost of more than 12% per annum in terms of risk-adjusted returns. That study assumes 
that  investors  make  fund  selection  decisions  in  a  Bayesian  way,  namely  that  they  take  into 
account the funds’ past performance, expenses and turnover. Moreover, a number of financial 
and  non-financial  fund  attributes  significantly  influence  investors’  decision  process  and, 
consequently, the money flows to SRI funds (Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang, 2006).  
Rather than making assumptions on fund selection process, we construct portfolios of 
SRI funds by tracking the actual fund selection decisions by investors  (i.e. the decisions of 
investing versus withdrawing money). More specifically, we employ Zheng’s (1999) approach 
to form portfolios of ethical and conventional funds based on recent cash-flow signals of the 
funds, where the cash flow in month t (Cash Flowt) is defined as the change in a fund’s assets 
under management (AUM) beyond the fund’s asset appreciation (assuming that new money is 
invested at the end of each month): Cash Flowt = AUMt – AUMt-1 (1+Returnt). In addition, we 
also define Flow in month t (Flowt) as the growth rate of fund assets under management (AUM) 
beyond the fund’s asset appreciation: Flowt = Cash Flowt /AUMt-1.The ‘new money portfolios’, 
are constructed by following the actual fund selection decisions by investors in the previous 
month:  (A)  Inflow  portfolios  are  cash-flow  weighted  portfolios  of  all  available  funds  with 
positive  new  cash  flows;  (B)  Outflow  portfolios  are  cash-flow  weighted  portfolios  of  all 
                                                 
31 An alternative explanation for the smart money effect is the momentum effect of stock returns: Sapp and Tiwari 
(2005) show that investors chase the mutual funds that performed well in the past. Such funds may perform well in 
subsequent periods due to the returns momentum rather than investors’ fund selection abilities. After controlling for 
the momentum effect in return regressions, the smart money effect disappears. 
32 In addition, we also define Flow in month t (Flowt) as the growth rate of fund assets under management (AUM) 
beyond fund asset appreciation: Flowt = Cash Flowt /AUMt-1.  
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available funds with negative new cash flows; (C) High-flow portfolios are equally weighted 
portfolios of all available funds with above-median new cash flow; and (D) Low-flow portfolios 
are equally weighted portfolios of all available funds with below-median new cash flows. In 
addition, we also construct the Average portfolios of ethical and conventional funds, which are 
the value-weighted (i.e. assets under management-weighted) portfolios of all available funds.
33  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The  risk-adjusted  returns  of  the  Inflow,  Outflow,  High-flow,  Low-flow  and  Average 
portfolios using the four-factor model (Eq. (2)) are shown in Table 7. First, we test whether or 
not a smart money effect exists by examining the difference in alphas between the Inflow and 
Outflow portfolios. The alphas of the inflow portfolios are negative for the UK, Europe and the 
Rest of World SRI funds, and are virtually zero for the US SRI funds. This implies that ethical 
investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform the benchmark factors in the 
future.  In  contrast,  we  find  evidence  that  ethical  investors  may  be  able  to  identify  poor 
performing funds: the portfolios from which ethical money was withdrawn have annual alphas 
of –3% for the UK ethical funds, -4.7% for the US and Continental European ethical funds, and 
–12.3% for the Rest of World ethical funds. Furthermore, a hypothetical strategy of going long 
in  the  inflow  portfolio  and  going  short  in  the  outflow  portfolio  yields  economically  and 
statistically significant alphas of 5.5% (and more specifically of 4.7% and 11.6% for ethical 
funds from the US and the Rest of World, respectively), where the abnormal returns are driven 
by the significant underperformance of outflow portfolios. We also note that, in line with Sapp 
and Tiwari’s (2005) findings, such a significant difference in alphas between the inflow and 
outflow portfolios does not exist for conventional funds in the UK and US.  
Second,  we  repeat  the  above  analysis  to  the  High-flow  and  Low-flow  portfolios. 
Comparing the alphas of the two portfolios, we find that ethical investors are unable to identify 
the good performers as none of the High-flow portfolios of SRI funds have significantly positive 
alphas.  There  is  some  evidence  that  ethical  investors  have  some  ability  to  identify  poorly 
                                                 
33 For each country or region, the above portfolios are formed at the beginning of each month based on relevant 
information from the previous month (i.e. cash-flows or assets under management). We hold the portfolios for one 
month and rebalance them at the beginning of the next month by applying the same criteria. All mutual funds 
(including the dead funds) with at least one-month history of returns are included in the portfolios. All available 
funds are partitioned into two categories: the first one received net money inflows over the preceding month (Inflow 
portfolio) whereas money was withdrawn (on a net basis) from the other funds (Outflow portfolio). The returns of 
the  Inflow  portfolio  are  the  returns  of  newly  invested  money,  while  those  of  the  Outflow  portfolio  are  the 
hypothetical returns of newly withdrawn money. Similarly, High-flow and Low-flow portfolios partition all funds 
into two groups with an equal number of funds in each group: one category received more inflows while the other 
received fewer inflows. Finally, the returns of the Average portfolio, where funds are weighted by fund assets under 
management, represent the returns of the total wealth invested in the ethical or conventional funds.   
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performing funds ex ante, especially in the UK and US. However, these results are weaker than 
for the cash-flow weighted portfolios. 
Third,  the  results  on  the  performance  of  the  Average  portfolio  suggest  that  the 
performance of ethical money invested in European (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World 
funds  is  poor.  The  value-weighted  average  SRI  funds  in  these  regions  significantly 
underperform  the  factor-mimicking  strategies  by  5.6%  and  6.2%  per  annum  respectively, 
implying that the total wealth invested in ethical funds is reduced by about 6% per annum on a 
risk-adjusted basis. Meanwhile, it is important to note that part of the underperformance is due 
to the fact that ethical funds charge management fees of about 1.5% per annum (see Table 1). 
The net transfer of wealth, from ethical investors to their fund managers, implies that investing 
in  socially  responsible  funds  might  be  not  a  socially  optimal  way  of  committing  to  ethical 
considerations.
34  
  Taken together, we find mixed results in terms of the existence of a smart money effect 
in the SRI fund industry: although ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will 
outperform the benchmark factors in the future, they have some fund-selection ability to identify 
the ethical funds that will perform poorly. In addition, the aggregate performance of money 
invested in ethical funds, especially in Europe (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World, is 
significantly lower than the benchmarks. 
 
IV  Determinants of Returns and Risk 
 
  While we have shown the return and risk characteristics of portfolios of SRI funds in 
Sections  II  and  III,  we  now  explore  the  cross-sectional  differences  between  SRI  funds  and 
investigate the determinants of returns and risk of SRI funds around the world. 
  
IV.A  Determinants of Returns 
 
In order to pursue their social objectives, SRI funds employ a set of investment screens 
that restrict the investment opportunities. While the exclusion of companies based on ethical, 
social, or environmental screens may constrain risk-return optimization, the use of screens can 
also be regarded as an active selection strategy aimed at generating superior fund performance. 
Therefore, we include the number and type of SRI screens in our model explaining SRI funds’ 
                                                 
34 For instance, alternative ways of committing to ethical considerations, such as donating 6% of one’s wealth 
directly to charities or paying 6% of environmental taxation, may be more cost efficient.  
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risk-adjusted  returns.  The  performance  of  SRI  funds  may  also  relate  to  other  fund 
characteristics, such as fund size, age, the fee structure and the reputation of the fund family. For 
instance,  Chen  et  al.    (2004)  show  that  fund  size  erodes  performance  due  to  liquidity  and 
organizational diseconomies, and that this relation is more pronounced for funds investing in 
small and illiquid stocks. Hence, our model of SRI fund returns around the world looks as 
follows: 
 
Risk-adjusted Returni,t = ￿0 + ￿1 Screening Activityi +￿2 Fund Characteristicsi,t-1  
+￿3 Fund Familyi,t-1 +￿Control Variablesi,t + u i,t            (12) 
 
where the Risk-adjusted Returni,t is the four-factor-adjusted return or the conditional four-factor-
adjusted  return  of  fund  i  in  month  t.
35    For  SRI  funds,  Screening  Activityi  comprises  the 
following variables: (i) Number of Screensi is the number of SRI screens, listed in Table 2, (ii) 
D(Sin Screensi), D(Ethical Screensi), D(Governance & Social Screensi) and D(Environmental 
Screensi) are four indicator variables which equal one if the fund uses at least one of the SRI 
screens from these broad screening categories, i.e. sin, ethical, corporate governance and social 
or environmental screens, respectively
36, (iii) D(islamic Fundi) is an indicator variable capturing 
whether  the  fund  is  designed  for  islamic  investors,  (iv)  D(Activism  Policyi)  is  an  indicator 
variable which equals one if the fund intends to influence corporate behaviour through direct 
engagement  or  proxy  voting,  (v)  D(In-House  SRI  Researchi)  equals  one  if  the  screening 
activities of the fund are based on in-house SRI research.  
The Fund Characteristicsi,t-1 is a vector of lagged variables consisting of: (i) Sizei,t-1, the 
natural logarithm of fund assets under management in Euro at month t-1; (ii) Agei,t-1, the number 
of years since the fund’s date of inception; (iii) Agei,t-1* D(Youngi,t-1), a term interacting the age 
with an indicator variable equalling one if the fund’s age is below the median of all SRI funds 
(or of all conventional ones – depending on the model specification) in its domicile for month t-
1; (iv) Total Feesi, defined as the sum of the annual management fee and one seventh of the sum 
of the front-end and the back-end load fees; (v) Total Feesi *D(High Feesi), a term interacting 
the total fees with an indicator variable equalling one if the fund’s total fees are above the 
median total fees of all SRI funds (or conventional ones) in its domicile; (vi) Riski,[t-1,t-12], the 
                                                 
35 The risk-adjusted return (in local currency) is defined as  e a +  (of Eq. (2) and (5)) and is estimated for each 
individual  fund using the benchmark  factors and information  variables  in domestic countries. The  four-factor-
adjusted returns are estimated for each fund with a return history of at least 24 months, while the conditional-model-
adjusted returns and risk loadings are estimated for each fund with at least 60 months’ returns. 
36 These four indicator variables are not mutually exclusive; all may equal one in case a fund employs screens from 
each of the four main screening categories.  
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total risk of the fund measured by the standard deviation of monthly fund returns for months t-1 
to t-12, and (vii) Average Returni,[t-1,t-12], the average return of fund i over months t-1 to t-12.   
Subsequently,  the Fund Familyi,t-1 variables proxy for the reputation of fund families in 
the SRI or conventional fund industries: (i) D(Top Performer Familyi,t-1) equals one if the raw 
return of at least one SRI (or conventional) fund in the fund’s family belongs to the top 20% of 
all SRI (or conventional) funds in the fund’s domicile in month t-1, (ii) Number of Funds in 
Familyi, t-1 is  the number of SRI (or conventional) funds belonging to the fund’s family at month 
t-1, (iii) D (Market Leader Familyi,t-1) equals one if the fund’s family has the highest market 
share of SRI assets among all SRI (or conventional) fund families in the family’s domicile at t-1.  
Furthermore,  the  Control  Variablesi,t-1  capture  the  impact  of  three  sets  of  variables: 
International  Diversification,  Geographical  Location  and  Time  Effects.  The  International 
Diversification  variables  include  two  mutually  exclusive  indicators,  denoted  as  D(European 
Diversificationi) and D(Global Diversificationi), which are set to one if the fund invests across 
Europe or globally, respectively. The reference group is the funds investing in their domestic 
countries. In order to capture the differences in the risk-adjusted returns across geographical 
locations, we include mutually exclusive indicator variables based on the domicile of the fund, 
denoted as D(Europei ex. UK), D(USi) and D(Rest of Worldi). The SRI funds domiciled in the 
UK are the reference group. Finally, we also include fixed time effects to control for the bubble 
and recession periods, i.e. nine year dummies and eleven month dummies, denoted as D(Yeari,t) 
and D(Monthi,t).  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
We report the estimation results of Equation (12) for SRI funds in Panel A of Table 8, 
while Panel B shows those for the conventional UK funds. Panel A of Table 10 presents a 
summary of the economic effects of Table 8.  First, we find that fund returns increase  with 
screening intensity (proxied by the number of SRI screens applied). All else equal, funds with 8 
more SRI screens (i.e. a two standard deviation difference) are associated with a 1.3% higher 4-
factor-adjusted return per annum. This finding supports the hypothesis that SRI criteria help 
fund  managers  to  pick  stocks.  However,  this  effect  disappears  when  we  measure  fund 
performance via the conditional 4-factor model. Funds employing a corporate governance and 
social screen can expect 2.1% higher annual returns (based on the conditional 4-factor model) 
than  funds  without  such  a  screen,  whereas  funds  employing  an  environmental  screen  are 
associated  with  1.6%  lower  returns  per  annum.  Furthermore,  employing  an  in-house  SRI 
                                                 
37 The estimation results of these time indicator variables are available upon request.  
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research team increases the 4-factor adjusted return by 1.2% per annum. This finding supports 
the hypothesis that the screening process generates value-relevant non-public information.  
Second, in line with Chen et al. (2004), we find that fund size erodes the returns of both 
SRI and conventional funds, although the effect is economically insignificant. In addition, we 
find that fund age and risk reduce the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds, whereas total fund fees 
do not significantly affect the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds. Finally, after controlling for 
screening activities, fund characteristics and fund family reputation, the risk-adjusted returns of 
SRI funds in Continental Europe and the Rest of World are about 4% lower (annually) than 
those of UK SRI funds.  
 
IV.B  Determinants of Risk 
 
While in the previous subsection, we document that screening activities and other fund 
characteristics affect risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds, we now examine what determines SRI 




i, t = ￿0 + ￿1 Screening Activityi +￿2 Fund Characteristicsi,t-1 




,i, t stands for the time-varying betas of fund i in month t for factor F which 
represents MKT, SMB, HML, or UMD. The risk loadings are estimated using Eq. (5) for each 
fund with at least 60 months’ returns history. A Risk Loading
F
i, t  ( t i F , , b ) is defined as the sum of 
a time-constant beta ( a i F , , b ) and four time-varying betas ( 1 , ' - t b F z b ) corresponding to the four 
information  variables  ( 4 3 2 1 , , , z z z z )  such  that  t i F , , b   equals  a i F , , b   1 , 1 1 , , - + t i F z b   1 , 2 2 , , - + t i F z b  
1 , 3 3 , , - + t i F z b   1 , 4 4 , , - + t i F z b . In addition to the Screening Activityi, Fund Characteristicsi,t-1, Fund 
Familyi,t-1  ,  and  Control  Variablesi,t  (defined  above,  Eq.  (12)),  we  also  include  Economic 
Conditioni,t-1, a set of explanatory variables consisting of the four lagged information variables: 
the interest rate, the dividend yield, the bond term-structure premium and the bond credit-risk 
premium in domestic countries. 
[Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here] 
 
  The estimation results of Eq. (13) are shown in Panels A (for SRI funds) and B (for 
conventional UK funds) of Table 9, while Panel B of Table 10 provides a summary of the  
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economic effects of the results of Table 9. First, we find that the screening activities of SRI 
funds have a significant impact on the risk loadings. All else equal, funds employing a sin screen 
have about 10% less exposure to the market, size and book-to-market factors than funds without 
such a screen. This implies that funds with sin screens adhere to investment styles focusing on 
low-betas, large-caps and growth. Corporate governance and social screens generate 13% higher 
loadings on large-cap stocks and 24% more exposure to growth stocks, whereas funds subject to 
environmental  criteria  have  8%  higher  loadings  on  value  stocks.  Interestingly,  SRI  funds 
adopting a policy of shareholder activism or employing an in-house SRI research team invest 
10% more in value stocks. 
We also show that the characteristics of mutual funds and fund families also affect the 
risk loadings of SRI funds. For instance, SRI funds with 1% higher fees invest 4% more in high-
beta stocks, 7% more in small stocks and 4% more in value stocks. In addition, a one-standard 
deviation increase in total risk of SRI funds is associated with about 9% higher loadings on the 
market factor, and 8% more exposure to small-cap growth stocks. An interesting result is that 
SRI funds belonging to a fund family with top performers invest 4% more in small stocks, while 
those belonging to a leading family in the SRI market (in terms of the market share) invest 6% 
more in large-cap value stocks.  
  Finally,  we  find  evidence  that  ethical  fund  managers  respond  to  macroeconomic 
conditions by changing their funds’ risk loadings. After a 1% increase in the average dividend 
yield, managers of SRI funds increase funds’ exposure to small-cap growth stocks from 7% to 
10%. When the credit-risk premium in the bond markets increases by 1%, SRI fund managers 
react to this news by investing about 8% more in (safer) large-cap value stocks.    
 
V   Conclusion    
 
This paper contributes to the literature of socially responsible investments as it studies 
the risk and return characteristics of nearly all SRI mutual funds around the world. Our main 
hypothesis is that ethical/social considerations influence the stock prices and that investors pay a 
price for the use of SRI screening of funds. The main reason why SRI investors are willing to 
pay such a price is based on an aversion to unethical/asocial corporate behavior. We investigate 
this hypothesis by focusing on the ethical/SRI mutual fund industry around the world. Investors 
of SRI funds explicitly deviate from the economically rational goal of wealth-maximization by 
pursuing social objectives.  
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Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in many European and 
Asia-Pacific countries strongly underperform domestic benchmark portfolios. In particular, the 
average  risk-adjusted  returns  of  the  SRI  funds  in  Belgium,  France,  Ireland,  Japan,  Norway, 
Singapore,  and  Sweden  are  lower  than  –5%  per  annum.  In  addition,  passive  portfolios  of 
European firms complying with ethical requirements, i.e. companies included in the European 
ethical indices, significantly underperform benchmark risk factors by about 4.5% per annum. 
These results support our hypothesis that ethical considerations influence the stock prices and 
that ethical firms are overpriced by the market. We also show that the power of the Fama and 
French’s risk factors to explain the SRI fund returns has significantly increased over the past 
decade. This signifies that SRI funds gradually converge to conventional funds in terms of the 
holdings  in  their  portfolios.  We  find  no  evidence  that  SRI  funds  managers  are  successfully 
timing the market nor that SRI funds suffer from a cost of reduced diversification.  
We find mixed results in terms of the existence of a ‘smart money’ effect in the SRI fund 
industry:  while  there  is  some  fund-selection  ability  in  identifying  poorly  performing  ethical 
funds, ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform their benchmarks in 
subsequent periods. The return of total wealth invested in ethical funds in Europe (excluding the 
UK) and the Rest of World is merely -6% per annum on a risk-adjusted basis.   
Our results on the determinants of SRI funds’ returns and risk loadings suggest that the 
screening activities of SRI funds matter: funds with a higher number of SRI screens have better 
returns even after controlling for well-known risk factors. In particular, a two standard-deviation 
increase in the SRI screening intensity generates 2.6% abnormal returns per annum. In addition, 
employing an in-house research team on SRI issues increases fund returns by 1.2% per annum. 
These results support the hypothesis that the screening process generates value-relevant non-
public information and that SRI screens help fund managers to pick stocks. We also find that the 
use of specific screens, such as corporate governance and social screens, has a positive impact 
on  the  risk-adjusted  returns  (by  2.1%  per  annum)  while  other  types  of  screens,  e.g. 
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 Table 1: Characteristics of equity SRI and non-SRI funds 
 
Panel  A  of  Table  1 reports  the  number  of  funds,  the  number  of  funds  in  a  family  (managed  by  the  same  financial 
institution), the age (years since the  fund’s inception), the Assets Under Management (in  million ￿), and the annual 
expenses (fund management fees), load fees (the sum of front-end fees and back-end fees) and total fees (the sum of 
management fees and one seventh of load fees) per fund for SRI funds around the world at the end of 2003. Panel B 





















Panel A: SRI                   
Overall  463  221  5.9  4.0  63.9  14.1  1.4%  2.9%  1.8% 
(1) UK                   
UK  58  24  9.2  7.5  100.7  49.8  1.3%  3.5%  1.8% 
Isle of Man  8  1  3.8  3.8  2.4  2.4  1.0%  0.0%  1.0% 
Guernsey  1  1  9.5  9.5  27.8  27.8  1.0%  0.0%  1.0% 
Total  67  26  9.0  7.2  95.5  48.4  1.3%  3.5%  1.8% 
(2) US                    
US  98  32  8.0  6.7  142.1  17.9  1.6%  1.8%  1.9% 
(3) Europe (excl. UK)                  
Austria  17  7  2.0  1.6  3.4  2.7  1.5%  4.5%  2.2% 
Belgium  21  7  3.6  3.0  24.4  9.1  0.9%  2.8%  1.3% 
France  59  34  3.9  3.3  22.7  10.3  1.4%  3.0%  1.8% 
Germany  12  7  8.0  8.0  51.5  51.5  1.3%  2.9%  1.7% 
Ireland  11  6  4.3  2.8  5.5  1.5  1.3%  1.1%  1.4% 
Italy  7  7  4.4  1.8  83.1  9.8  1.8%  0.0%  1.8% 
Luxembourg  15  8  4.6  3.4  41.3  11.0  1.3%  2.2%  1.6% 
Netherlands  19  12  4.0  3.4  61.3  20.5  1.2%  1.2%  1.3% 
Norway  3  2  8.2  6.5  N/A  N/A  1.9%  0.7%  2.0% 
Sweden  26  13  7.6  8.9  33.5  7.6  1.3%  3.9%  1.9% 
Switzerland  16  7  3.6  3.4  45.1  29.2  1.3%  3.8%  1.8% 
Total  206  110  4.1  3.1  32.0  8.8  1.3%  2.8%  1.7% 
(4) Rest of the World                   
Australia  36  11  5.2  2.8  7.9  1.7  1.6%  2.5%  1.9% 
Canada  7  5  4.7  3.1  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Cayman Islands  1  1  3.8  3.8  2.4  2.4  1.5%  2.0%  1.8% 
Japan  13  10  5.0  4.2  42.8  24.8  1.6%  2.4%  1.9% 
Malaysia  26  19  6.2  2.4  42.6  22.9  1.5%  6.7%  2.4% 
NL Antilles  1  1  6.0  6.0  119.0  119.0  2.0%  5.5%  2.8% 
Singapore  4  3  3.9  3.9  0.7  0.7  1.0%  5.0%  1.7% 
South Africa  4  3  5.0  3.1  28.2  14.4  1.4%  4.8%  2.1% 
Total  92  53  5.4  2.8  26.3  6.9  1.5%  4.0%  2.1% 
                   
Panel B: Non-SRI                   
Non-SRI (UK)  716  133  12.5  10.0  270.0  71.4  1.3%  3.9%  1.8% 




Table 2: Summary of screening activities of SRI funds 
 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the 21 investment screens used by SRI funds around the world which are classified into 4 
broad categories. SRI funds often use a combination of the screens. Positive screens (funds select firms based on 
relative criteria) are in italics and the remaining screens are negative screens (funds exclude specific industries or 
firms). Panel B shows the number of screens per fund, the number of negative or positive screens, the number of 
sin, ethical, corporate governance and social, and environmental screens used. Furthermore, it reports the fraction of 
the funds that use negative, positive, sin, ethical, corporate governance and social, environmental or islamic screens, 
and of those that engage in shareholder activism or base their screening activity on in-house research, and the 
fraction of the funds that invest across Europe, the world or within their domestic countries.  
 
Panel A: Definition of SRI screens  
Categories  Screens 
Sin  Tobacco, Alcohol, Gambling, Weapons, Pornography 
Ethical   Animal Testing, Abortion, Genetic Engineering, Non-Marital, Islamic, Healthcare 
Corporate Governance and 
Social 
Corporate Governance, Business Practice, Community, Labor Diversity, Labor 
Relations, Human Rights, Foreign Operations 
Environmental  Nuclear, Environment, Renewable Energy 
  
Panel B: Summary statistics 
  UK  USA  Europe ex. UK  Rest of World  Overall 
By fund: Average number of           
Screens  9.52  8.14  6.62  5.59  7.12 
Negative screens  5.85  4.55  3.00  3.51  3.81 
Positive screens  3.67  3.59  3.62  2.08  3.31 
Sin screens  3.60  3.31  1.73  2.69  2.52 
Ethical screens  1.40  0.67  0.56  0.53  0.68 
Governance & Social screens  2.62  2.71  2.70  1.49  2.45 
Environmental screens  1.90  1.45  1.63  0.88  1.47 
Percentage of funds with            
Negative screens  85%  97%  56%  72%  72% 
Positive screens  87%  69%  92%  58%  79% 
Sin screens  85%  92%  54%  67%  69% 
Ethical screens  85%  57%  38%  52%  51% 
Governance & Social screens  85%  68%  78%  47%  70% 
Environmental screens  94%  72%  88%  60%  80% 
Islamic screens  2%  3%  3%  36%  9% 
Activism policy  31%  47%  18%  6%  24% 
In-house SRI research  27%  55%  22%  11%  28% 
European Diversification  4%  0%  33%  0%  15% 
Global Diversification  40%  16%  61%  17%  39% 
Domestic Investment  56%  84%  7%  83%  46% 
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Table 3: Performance of SRI funds ￿
￿
Panel A of Table 3 presents the average excess return (i.e. fund return in excess of the risk-free interest rate) and the 
CAPM model estimates (Equation (1)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and for non-SRI funds in 
the UK and the US, and reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. Panel B presents 
the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model estimates (Equation (2)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the 
world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. The gross alphas are estimated by adding back one twelfth of 
annual management fees to the monthly fund returns before running the regressions. Panel C reports the four-factor 
model estimates (Equation (2)) and the gross alphas for equally weighted SRI funds in each country with at least 
five years of returns data. The returns of the country portfolios are in local currency and evaluated from a local 
investor’s perspective, i.e. with local benchmark factors and local risk-free rates. The estimates of excess returns 
and alphas (￿ 1 and ￿ 4) are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with Newey-West standard errors 
and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance 
level of at least 10%.  
 












SRI:         
United Kingdom (￿)  1.63  -2.68  0.87  0.83 
  0.42  -1.55  23.37  155 
United States ($)  5.17  -2.84  0.94  0.97 
  1.30  -3.32  69.63  156 
Europe ex. UK (￿)  0.22  -4.31  0.78  0.82 
  0.05  -2.24  23.69  155 
Rest of World ($)  -0.68  0.74  0.49  0.45 
  -0.17  0.26  7.54  155 
World ($)  2.64  -1.38  0.84  0.88 
  0.74  -0.95  29.42  155 
Non-SRI:         
United Kingdom (￿)  3.43  -1.23  0.94  0.83 
  0.82  -0.67  24.12  155 
United States ($)  6.08  -1.52  0.89  0.95 
  1.59  -1.52  56.94  156 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:         
United Kingdom (￿)  -1.80  -1.45  -0.07  0.00 
  -0.32  -0.58  -1.29   
United States ($)  -0.90  -1.32  0.05  0.02 
  -0.16  -1.00  2.35   
￿ 
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(Table 3 - Continued) 
￿
















Gross ￿ 4 
(t-stat.) 
SRI:               
United Kingdom (￿)  -2.22  0.89  0.40  -0.06  -0.02  0.96  -0.97 
  -2.63  53.01  20.38  -2.86  -1.30  155  -1.15 
United States ($)  -3.37  0.94  0.10  0.05  -0.01  0.97  -1.76 
  -4.48  67.68  3.62  2.73  -1.07  156  -2.33 
Europe ex. UK (￿)  -3.48  0.79  0.06  -0.07  -0.05  0.82  -2.18 
  -1.85  21.64  1.03  -2.11  -1.49  155  -1.16 
Rest of World ($)  0.14  0.57  0.44  -0.03  0.15  0.57  1.66 
  0.06  10.71  3.98  -0.40  3.39  155  0.71 
World ($)  -2.04  0.86  0.19  0.00  0.02  0.89  -0.63 
  -1.53  28.32  3.98  0.08  0.98  155  -0.47 
Non-SRI:               
United Kingdom (￿)  -1.14  0.95  0.18  0.00  0.00  0.85  0.12 
  -0.66  26.73  4.60  -0.09  -0.15  155  0.07 
United States ($)  -2.48  0.89  0.18  0.07  0.00  0.97  -0.85 
  -2.93  58.52  9.67  2.99  -0.23  156  -1.00 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:               
United Kingdom (￿)  -1.08  -0.06  0.22  -0.05  -0.02  0.11  -1.09 
  -0.56  -1.53  4.93  -1.31  -0.56    -0.57 
United States ($)  -0.89  0.05  -0.08  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.91 
  -0.78  2.53  -2.27  -0.40  -0.48    -0.80 
 
















Gross ￿ 4 
(t-stat.) 
Australia  -2.59  0.65  0.10  0.04  0.04  0.78  -1.01 
  -2.12  18.33  2.53  1.05  1.68  155  -0.83 
Belgium  -5.26  0.72  0.26  0.07  -0.01  0.53  -4.36 
  -1.61  11.32  3.27  0.92  -0.23  140  -1.33 
France  -5.96  0.77  0.26  0.01  -0.05  0.77  -4.56 
  -3.32  17.60  5.73  0.32  -2.08  155  -2.54 
Germany  -0.62  0.70  0.35  0.01  -0.10  0.56  0.66 
  -0.17  12.12  3.86  0.08  -2.54  155  0.18 
Ireland  -6.14  0.65  0.21  -0.05  -0.02  0.69  -4.88 
  -2.75  16.86  4.02  -1.17  -0.73  155  -2.19 
Italy  -2.82  0.32  0.07  -0.10  -0.04  0.38  -0.98 
  -0.89  6.06  1.37  -1.98  -0.79  118  -0.31 
Japan  -5.03  0.73  0.05  0.06  0.01  0.87  -3.43 
  -3.15  23.35  0.94  1.41  0.36  155  -2.15 
Luxembourg  -3.34  0.72  -0.15  -0.15  -0.03  0.75  -2.03 
  -1.18  11.59  -1.24  -2.26  -0.70  90  -0.72 
Malaysia  -2.99  0.58  0.18  -0.13  0.06  0.92  -1.53 
  -1.69  20.53  4.73  -2.82  2.84  155  -0.86 
Netherlands  -4.10  0.81  0.29  0.06  0.01  0.73  -2.93 
  -1.98  20.31  4.86  1.50  0.41  155  -1.42 
Norway  -5.20  0.88  0.32  0.07  -0.06  0.75  -3.27 
  -1.36  16.88  3.03  1.26  -0.92  89  -0.85 
Singapore  -5.71  0.57  0.13  -0.18  0.12  0.52  -4.71 
  -1.07  6.46  1.65  -3.00  2.81  75  -0.88 
Sweden  -6.46  0.56  0.12  -0.13  -0.05  0.71  -5.12 
  -2.36  7.97  1.70  -2.79  -1.95  142  -1.87 
Switzerland  -3.01  0.83  0.41  -0.06  -0.05  0.62  -1.75 
  -1.10  13.30  4.47  -1.10  -1.06  155  -0.64  
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Table 4: The ‘ethics’ risk factor 
￿
Panel A of Table 4 presents the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model estimates (Equation (2)) for returns of the 
FTSE 4 Good UK, US, Europe and World Indices. Panel B presents the estimates of a five-factor model (Equation 
(3)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US, and reports the 
differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. The five-factor model includes an ‘ethics’ factor 
which  consists  of  the  excess  returns  of  the  FTSE  4  Good  indices.  The  estimates  of  alphas  (￿4  and  ￿5)  are 
annualized. The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to 
account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%.  
￿
















FTSE 4 Good Indices:             
United Kingdom  (￿)  -4.83  0.94  -0.08  0.02  0.00  0.94 
  -3.52  35.73  -2.73  0.79  -0.13  89 
United States  ($)  -0.98  1.04  -0.24  -0.13  -0.01  0.95 
  -0.59  31.46  -7.30  -2.99  -0.60  89 
Europe ex. UK (￿)  -4.37  0.86  -0.31  0.09  -0.05  0.91 
  -1.87  20.94  -4.18  1.82  -1.58  89 
World ($)  -0.39  1.06  -0.31  -0.03  0.01  0.96 
  -0.30  40.57  -8.16  -0.94  0.78  89 
￿



















SRI:               
United Kingdom  (￿)  -2.56  0.84  0.39  -0.06  -0.02  0.06  0.96 
  -2.17  12.63  15.46  -2.70  -1.37  0.78  89 
United States  ($)  -2.74  0.97  0.07  0.06  -0.02  -0.03  0.98 
  -2.94  14.14  2.25  2.39  -1.94  -0.46  89 
Europe ex. UK (￿)  -2.99  0.44  0.26  -0.10  -0.03  0.47  0.89 
  -1.19  4.33  4.04  -2.61  -1.02  4.44  89 
Rest of World ($)  -1.82  0.62  0.47  -0.11  0.07  0.30  0.66 
  -0.57  6.85  3.24  -1.07  1.35  5.08  89 
World ($)  -1.79  0.63  0.29  -0.02  -0.03  0.25  0.94 
  -1.25  4.62  4.89  -0.40  -1.19  2.19  89 
Non-SRI:               
United Kingdom  (￿)  -3.65  1.24  0.15  0.02  0.00  -0.27  0.87 
  -1.46  8.63  3.32  0.50  0.08  -1.85  89 
United States  ($)  -3.28  1.23  0.11  0.05  -0.01  -0.31  0.98 
  -2.91  20.36  4.47  1.75  -0.78  -5.87  89 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:               
United Kingdom  (￿)  1.08  -0.40  0.24  -0.08  -0.02  0.33  0.08 
  0.39  -2.52  4.65  -1.86  -0.86  2.01   
United States  ($)  0.54  -0.25  -0.04  0.02  -0.01  0.28  0.00 
  0.37  -2.75  -0.92  0.50  -0.74  3.45    
￿ 
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Table 5: Development of returns and risk over time 
 
Panel A presents the estimates of alphas and adjusted R-squared in the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (see 
Equation (2)) for the pre-bubble period of 1991-1995, the bubble period of 1996-1999 and the post-bubble period of 
2000-2003 for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. Panel A also 
reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. Panel B reports the sub-sample estimates 
of alphas and adjusted R-squared where the dependent variable is the return of equally weighted SRI funds and the 
independent variable is the return of equally weighted non-SRI funds in the UK and US respectively (Equation (4)). 
The estimates of alphas are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with Newey-West standard errors 
and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance 
level of at least 10%. ￿
 
Panel A: The Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model results￿
    ￿ 4      Radj
2   
   1991-95  1996-99  2000-03  1991-95  1996-99  2000-03 
SRI:             
United Kingdom  (￿)  -1.68  -1.66  -4.18  0.97  0.94  0.96 
   -1.68  -1.18  -2.40       
United States (￿)  -4.96  -3.53  -2.14  0.97  0.98  0.98 
   -6.63  -3.99  -1.51       
Europe ex. UK (￿)  -2.01  -6.23  -4.37  0.63  0.82  0.87 
  -0.79  -1.74  -1.43       
Rest of World ($)  3.51  -3.05  3.47  0.61  0.62  0.77 
  1.33  -0.71  1.12       
World ($)  -2.93  -2.16  -1.04  0.80  0.93  0.97 
   -1.26  -1.16  -0.64       
Non-SRI:             
United Kingdom  (￿)  1.42  -4.06  -4.16  0.80  0.81  0.93 
  0.44  -1.01  -1.89       
United States (￿)  -2.04  -2.52  -2.56  0.95  0.97  0.98 
   -2.02  -1.48  -2.45       
SRI vs. Non-SRI:             
United Kingdom  (￿)  -3.10  2.41  -0.02  0.17  0.13  0.03 
  -0.92  0.56  -0.01       
United States (￿)  -2.92  -1.01  0.41  0.02  0.01  0.00 
   -2.32  -0.53  0.23       
 
Panel B: Equally weighted SRI funds vs. Equally weighted non-SRI funds￿
     ￿ 4      Radj
2   
   1991-95  1996-99  2000-03  1991-95  1996-99  2000-03 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:             
United Kingdom (￿)  -1.66  2.58  -2.26  0.80  0.77  0.90 
   -0.65  0.67  -1.12       
United States (￿)  -2.14  -0.16  -1.51  0.92  0.96  0.97 
   -1.86  -0.10  -1.64        
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￿
Table 6: Diversification, time-varying risk and market timing 
 
Panel A presents the conditional alphas in the conditional version of the four- and five-factor models (see Equation 
(5) and (6) and the ‘market timing’ coefficient in the conditional four-factor model (see Equation (7)) for equally 
weighted  SRI  funds  around  the  world  and  non-SRI  funds  in  the  UK  and  the  US.  This  panel  also  shows  the 
differences  in  the  estimates  between  SRI  and  non-SRI  funds.  Panel  B  presents  the  costs  of  inadequate 
diversification (Div1 and Div4) and net selectivity (NS1 and NS4), which were introduced by Fama (1972) (see 
Equations (8)-(11)), for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and Non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. 
The  panel  also  reports  the  differences  in  the  estimates  between  SRI  and  Non-SRI  funds.  The  estimates  of 
conditional alphas, diversification losses, and net selectivity are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics and are 
calculated  with  Newey-West  standard  errors  and  lags  of  order  three  to  account  for  autocorrelation  and 
heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%.  
￿
  Panel A: Time-varying risks    Panel B: Costs of inadequate diversification   
  
Conditional ￿ 4 
(t-stat.) 












SRI:               
United Kingdom (￿)  -1.90  -2.17  -0.19  0.41  0.08  -3.09  -2.30 
   -2.31  -2.21  -0.54  1.23  0.92  -1.91  -2.84 
United States ($)  -3.75  -3.35  0.19  0.14  0.12  -2.98  -3.49 
   -6.41  -3.71  1.22  2.07  2.19  -3.61  -5.09 
Europe ex. UK (￿)  -2.51  -0.61  -0.10  0.48  0.38  -4.79  -3.87 
  -1.31  -0.21  -0.25  1.06  0.86  -2.55  -2.06 
Rest of World ($)  -0.11  -0.56  -2.69  -0.68  -0.25  1.42  0.39 
  -0.06  -0.16  -4.01  -0.46  -0.22  0.47  0.15 
World ($)  -1.84  -1.23  -0.21  0.27  0.27  -1.66  -2.31 
   -1.39  -0.76  -0.61  1.22  1.37  -1.13  -1.64 
Non-SRI:               
United Kingdom  (￿)  -3.08  -3.04  -0.38  0.42  0.38  -1.68  -1.52 
  -1.69  -1.04  -0.70  1.23  1.14  -0.90  -0.88 
United States ($)  -2.11  -3.20  -0.11  0.21  0.12  -1.73  -2.61 
   -2.76  -2.51  -0.66  2.07  2.27  -1.69  -3.47 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:               
United Kingdom  (￿)  1.17  0.87  0.19  -0.01  -0.30  -1.41  -0.78 
  0.59  0.28  0.29  -0.02  -0.86  -0.57  -0.41 
United States ($)  -1.64  -0.15  0.29  -0.06  0.00  -1.25  -0.89 
   -1.70  -0.10  1.32  -0.53  -0.04  -0.95  -0.87 
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 Table 7: Smart money  
￿
This table presents the alpha estimates of the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (￿ 4 in Equation (2)) for 
investors’ portfolios of SRI funds around the world and Non-SRI funds in the UK and the US, and reports the 
differences in the estimates between SRI and Non-SRI funds. The investors’ portfolios are the value-weighted 
average portfolios and four new money portfolios including the inflow (column A), outflow (column B), high-flow 
(column C) and low-flow (column D) portfolios which are constructed using past cash flow signals (described in 
Section II.C). The VW, CW and EW in brackets denote the value (assets under management)-weighted, cash-flow 
weighted, equally weighted portfolios, respectively. The table also reports the difference in the estimated alphas 
between  the  inflow  and  outflow  portfolios  (column  A-B),  and  between  the  high-flow  and  low-flow  portfolios 
((column C-D). The estimates of alphas are annualized. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with Newey-West 
standard errors and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a 





























     (A)  (B)  (A) - (B)  (C)  (D)  (C) - (D) 
SRI:               
United Kingdom (￿)  -1.68  -2.34  -3.06  0.72  -1.14  -3.13  1.99 
   -1.44  -1.66  -1.49  0.29  -0.99  -2.09  1.05 
United States ($)  -0.99  0.07  -4.68  4.74  -1.71  -4.85  3.14 
   -0.96  0.04  -2.15  1.71  -2.07  -4.31  2.25 
Europe ex. UK (￿)  -5.63  -1.15  -4.69  3.54  -4.99  -2.38  -2.60 
  -2.32  -0.41  -1.51  0.84  -2.06  -0.96  -0.75 
Rest of World ($)  -6.22  -0.78  -12.34  11.57  1.26  -1.69  2.95 
  -2.00  -0.16  -2.98  1.78  0.38  -0.93  0.78 
World ($)  -0.14  0.89  -4.65  5.54  -0.11  -1.57  1.46 
   -0.10  0.45  -2.55  2.05  -0.07  -1.05  0.67 
Non-SRI:               
United Kingdom (￿)  -2.16  -1.30  -0.87  -0.43  -1.60  -1.51  -0.09 
  -2.25  -0.94  -0.53  -0.20  -1.07  -0.81  -0.04 
United States ($)  -1.97  -1.16  -3.03  1.87  -1.93  -3.16  1.23 
   -3.45  -1.26  -3.01  1.38  -2.39  -3.20  0.96 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:               
United Kingdom (￿)  0.48  -1.04  -2.19  1.15  0.46  -1.62  2.08 
  0.32  -0.52  -0.83  0.35  0.24  -0.68  0.68 
United States ($)  0.99  1.22  -1.65  2.88  0.22  -1.69  1.92 




Table 8: Determinants of risk-adjusted returns in SRI funds 
￿
This table presents the OLS estimates of determinants of risk-adjusted returns (see Equation (12)) for SRI funds 
(Panel A) and non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the four-factor- and conditional four-
factor-adjusted returns of fund i in month t (i.e. t i i , e a + in Equation (2) and (5)) respectively. Individual fund 
returns are in local currency and evaluated from a local investor’s perspective (i.e. using local benchmark factors 
and local risk-free rate). The independent variables include the following variables.  Number of Screensi is the 
number of SRI screens employed, and D(Sin Screensi),D(Ethical Screensi),D(Governance & Social Screensi) and 
D(Environmental Screensi) are four dummies which equal 1 if the fund uses at least one of the main SRI screens. 
D(Islamic Fundi) captures whether the fund is designed for islamic investors, D(Activism Policyi) equals 1 if the 
fund aims at actively influencing corporate behaviour, and D(In-House SRI Researchi) equals 1 if the fund has in-
house SRI research. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of AUM in ￿ (Sizei,t-1). Age is the number of years 
(Agei,t-1). We also include an interaction term of age and a dummy equalling 1 if the age is below the median of all 
SRI  (or  conventional)  funds  in  its  domicile  (Agei,t-1*  D(Youngi,t-1  )).  Total  Feesi  is  the  sum  of  the  annual 
management fee and 1/7
th of the sum of front- and the back-end load fees. We also include an interaction term of 
total fees and an dummy equalling 1 if the total fees are above the median total fees of all funds in the domicile 
(Total  Feesi  *D(High  Feesi)).  The  total  risk  is  the  standard  deviation  of  monthly  fund  returns  (Riski,t-1)),  and 
Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] is the average returns of fund i over the months t-1 to t-12. D(Top Performer Familyi,t-1)  
equals 1 if the raw returns of at least one SRI (or conventional) fund in the funds’ family belongs to the top 20% of 
all funds in its domicile. Number Funds Familyi, t-1 is the number of SRI (or conventional) funds managed by the 
funds’  family,  D(Market  Leader  Familyi,t-1)  equals  1  if  the  funds’  family  has  the  highest  market  share  in  its 
domicile, D(European Diversificationi) and D(Global Diversificationi) equal 1 if the fund invests across Europe or 
globally.  We  include  dummies  based  on  the  domicile  of  the  fund  (D(Europe  ex.  UKi),  D(USi)  and  D(Rest  of 
Worldi)), and 9 year dummies and 11 month dummies. The coefficients on indicator variables (denoted with a prefix 
“D”) and the count variables (i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) are 
multiplied by 100. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. 
Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%.  
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(Table 8 - Continued) 
 
￿
    Panel A: SRI  Panel B: Non-SRI (UK) 
Dependent variable   
4-F Adj Return 
Cond 
4-F Adj Return  4-F Adj Return 
Cond 
4-F Adj Return 
  Constant  -0.545  -3.181  -0.251  -1.464  0.803  4.452  1.144  7.130 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  0.026  2.648  0.003  0.263         
  D Sin Screens  -0.070  -0.971  0.081  0.963         
  D Ethical Screens  -0.077  -1.347  -0.010  -0.167         
  D Governance & Social Screens  -0.092  -1.399  0.171  2.335         
  D Environmental Screens  -0.072  -1.139  -0.136  -1.995         
  D Islamic Fund  0.151  1.334  0.386  3.203         
  D Activism Policy  0.008  0.159  -0.145  -2.563         
  D In-House SRI Research  0.098  2.055  0.058  1.104         
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  -0.000  -3.333  -0.000  -1.949  -0.001  -4.070  -0.000  -3.048 
  Age (t-1)  -0.012  -2.507  -0.017  -3.873  0.003  1.799  0.002  1.583 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.003  0.183  -0.029  -2.218  0.007  0.991  0.008  1.320 
  Total Fees  -0.009  -0.173  -0.061  -1.063  -0.045  -0.857  -0.009  -0.183 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -0.046  -1.462  -0.058  -1.634  0.074  3.050  0.067  3.094 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)  -0.035  -2.196  -0.012  -0.782  -0.051  -2.297  -0.142  -7.365 
  Average Return (t-1, t-12)  0.020  1.100  0.031  1.598  0.095  4.493  0.083  4.594 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  0.008  0.187  -0.015  -0.347  0.027  0.594  0.010  0.235 
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  -0.009  -1.538  0.003  0.543  0.001  0.209  -0.003  -0.517 
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  0.016  0.255  0.086  1.328  0.003  0.035  -0.012  -0.147 
Internat. Diversification  D European Diversification  0.057  0.576  0.008  0.050  0.208  1.849  0.190  2.027 
  D Global Diversification  -0.127  -2.482  -0.066  -1.207  -0.202  -5.450  -0.315  -9.699 
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  -0.338  -4.462  -0.137  -1.613         
  D US  -0.017  -0.256  -0.158  -2.160         
  D Rest of World  0.040  0.482  -0.351  -3.793         
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.034  15.277  0.021  7.086  0.039  34.979  0.045  39.743 
  Observations  17889    12747    27402    27082   
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 Table 9: Determinants of risk loadings  
￿
This table presents the OLS estimates of determinants of risk loadings (Equation (13)) for SRI funds (Panel A) and 
Non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the beta (i.e. the sum of time-constant and time-
varying betas) of fund i in month t for factors MKT, SMB, HML or UMD in the conditional four-factor model as by 
Equation (5). Individual fund returns are in local currency and evaluated from a local investor’s perspective (i.e. 
using  local  benchmark  factors  and  local  risk-free  rate)  for  funds  with  at  least  five  years’  return  history.  The 
independent  variables  consist  of  variables  capturing  economic  conditions  including  the  one-month  inter-bank 
interest rate or treasury bill rate (Interest Rate), the dividend yield of the value-weighted local market indices 
(Dividend Yield), a bond term-structure premium measured by the ten-year government bond yield minus the one-
month treasury bill rate (Term Structure Premium), and a bond credit-risk premium measured by corporate bond 
yield minus the ten-year government bond yield (or the Moody’s BAA rated bond yield minus the Moody’s AAA 
rated bond yield for the US) (Credit-Risk Premium). The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with White standard 
errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%.  
￿
    Panel A: SRI 
Dependent variable    Conditional MKT Conditional SMB Conditional HML Conditional UMD 
  Constant  0.636  21.740  0.120  2.566  0.255  6.752  0.045  1.810 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  0.009  7.970  0.011  6.450  0.007  4.383  -0.001  -1.199 
  D Sin Screens  -0.114  -13.976  -0.116  -10.042  -0.091  -8.177  -0.004  -0.695 
  D Ethical Screens  0.045  8.218  0.016  1.838  -0.053  -6.028  0.026  5.371 
  D Governance & Social Screens  -0.016  -2.094  -0.134  -9.637  -0.239  -20.647  0.047  7.490 
  D Environmental Screens  -0.036  -5.051  -0.003  -0.272  0.084  8.430  -0.042  -7.840 
  D Islamic Fund  -0.114  -9.349  -0.073  -4.315  -0.080  -4.917  -0.052  -6.605 
  D Activism Policy  -0.081  -13.539  -0.052  -5.550  0.098  11.731  -0.057  -11.243 
  D In-House SRI Research  -0.024  -4.989  0.052  6.407  0.101  13.610  -0.046  -11.578 
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  -0.003  -3.419  -0.002  -1.280  0.008  6.440  -0.004  -4.805 
  Age (t-1)  -0.001  -1.668  -0.002  -4.101  -0.004  -7.311  0.001  2.097 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.005  3.630  -0.005  -2.318  -0.004  -2.452  0.004  3.025 
  Total Fees  4.293  7.122  7.356  7.775  4.303  5.621  -0.643  -1.657 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -3.972  -12.079  -2.110  -4.033  -1.426  -3.424  0.188  0.805 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)  4.254  32.298  3.580  17.809  -3.363  -20.275  -0.150  -1.641 
  Average Return (t-1, t-12)  0.510  3.273  1.086  4.360  -0.851  -3.718  0.473  3.874 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  -0.002  -0.607  0.042  6.565  0.001  0.129  0.020  5.835 
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  0.004  6.459  -0.003  -2.995  -0.005  -5.751  0.001  1.741 
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  -0.011  -2.012  -0.061  -7.021  0.061  7.956  0.011  2.826 
Economic Condition  Interest Rate (t-1)  0.921  3.186  0.567  1.298  2.733  6.681  -2.498  -10.245 
  Dividend Yield (t-1)  -0.285  -0.411  9.755  8.719  -6.672  -7.402  3.500  5.992 
  Term Structure Premium (t-1)  -0.081  -0.238  5.289  10.379  -1.775  -3.963  -1.170  -4.096 
  Credit Risk Premium (t-1)  4.502  6.616  -8.573  -8.068  6.737  7.064  0.163  0.352 
Internat. Diversification  D European Diversification  0.129  7.246  -0.078  -2.682  -0.128  -7.501  -0.024  -1.807 
  D Global Diversification  -0.087  -16.760  -0.086  -11.413  -0.054  -7.851  -0.023  -5.852 
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  0.016  1.571  -0.181  -11.353  -0.126  -10.298  0.053  8.186 
  D US  0.106  8.653  -0.246  -11.447  -0.040  -2.432  0.125  11.161 
  D Rest of World  -0.175  -17.166  -0.369  -23.015  0.067  5.163  0.062  8.348 
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.398  176.740  0.208  70.603  0.232  81.189  0.102  31.189 




(Table 9 - Continued) 
￿
    Panel B: Non-SRI (UK) 
Dependent variable    Conditional MKT Conditional SMB Conditional HML Conditional UMD 
  Constant  0.849  23.408  -0.104  -1.959  0.195  3.896  -0.077  -1.954 
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  0.006  5.969  -0.037  -23.918  -0.001  -0.938  -0.001  -0.604 
  Age (t-1)  -0.000  -2.910  0.002  7.757  0.000  2.925  0.000  3.471 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.002  6.078  0.007  10.946  0.000  -0.942  0.000  -0.061 
  Total Fees  -0.424  -1.239  0.861  1.521  1.837  4.604  0.496  1.697 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  0.235  1.624  4.619  20.263  -0.764  -4.357  0.699  5.378 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)  4.709  37.577  4.167  22.350  0.642  4.832  -0.012  -0.085 
  Average Return (t-1, t-12)  -0.001  -1.580  -0.001  -2.154  0.000  0.708  0.000  0.585 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  2.002  16.812  3.535  18.935  1.046  8.056  2.353  17.904 
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  -0.064  -1.804  0.017  0.282  0.216  5.226  -0.049  -1.721 
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  -0.005  -1.735  0.047  10.271  0.000  0.013  0.014  5.698 
Economic Condition  Interest Rate (t-1)  5.924  16.137  4.301  7.356  -1.492  -2.629  -3.311  -7.575 
  Dividend Yield (t-1)  -15.318  -27.281  -13.598  -14.381  -13.546  -18.845  5.832  10.778 
  Term Structure Premium (t-1)  3.498  9.608  9.450  17.789  7.402  18.111  -0.442  -1.346 
  Credit Risk Premium (t-1)  2.678  4.004  20.828  20.468  21.398  29.046  -4.912  -8.541 
Internat. Diversification  D European Diversification  -0.058  -6.932  -0.027  -2.072  -0.009  -1.099  -0.058  -7.115 
  D Global Diversification  -0.105  -41.479  -0.049  -10.752  0.129  38.656  0.061  26.083 
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.277  281.930  0.171  152.690  0.222  209.830  0.092  75.291 
  Observations  27124    27124    27124    27124   
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Table 10: Economic effects of the determinants of risk-adjusted returns and risks 
 
This table summarizes the (annualized) economic effects of a standardized change (e.g. a change of one percent, an 
event (a dummy variable of 1), or a change of one standard deviation (1 S.D.)) in the explanatory variables (which 
are statistically significant at the 5% level) in Tables 8 and 9.  
 







4-factor adj. returns 
Impact on conditional  
4-factor adj.  returns 
      SRI  Non-SRI  SRI  Non-SRI 
Screening Activity             
Number of Screens    1 SD (4.1)  1.3%       
D Sin Screens    1         
D Ethical Screens    1         
D Governance & Social Screens    1      2.1%   
D Environmental Screens    1      -1.6%   
D Islamic Fund    1      4.6%   
D Activism Policy    1      -1.7%   
D In-House SRI Research    1  1.2%       
Fund Characteristics             
Size  -  1 SD (2.2)    -2.6%    -1.5% 
Age Old    1 SD (5.3)  -0.8%  0.2%  -1.0%   
Age Young    1 SD (5.3)  -0.8%  0.2%  -2.9%   
Total Fees Low  -  1%         
Total Fees High  -  1%    0.9%    0.8% 
Risk  -  1 SD (2.2%)  -0.9%  -1.3%    -3.7% 
Average Return    1%    1.1%    1.0% 
Fund Family             
D Top Performer Family    1         
Number Funds in Family    1 SD (4.2)         
D Market Leader Family    1         
Int. Diversification             
D European Diversif.    1        2.3% 
D Global Diversif.    1  -1.5%      -3.8% 
Geographical Location             
D Europe (ex. UK)    1  -4.1%       
D US    1      -1.9%   




(Table 10 - Continued) 
 




Impact on  
MKT loadings 
Impact on 
 SMB loadings 
Impact on 
 HML loadings 
Impact on 
 UMD loadings 
    SRI  Conv  SRI  Conv.  SRI  Conv  SRI  Conv 
Screening Activity                   
Number of Screens  1 SD (4.1)  4%    5%    3%       
D Sin Screens  1  -11%    -12%    -9%       
D Ethical Screens  1  5%        -5%    3%   
D Governance & Social Screens  1  -2%    -13%    -24%    5%   
D Environmental Screens  1  -4%        8%    -4%   
D Islamic Fund  1  -11%    -7%    -8%    -5%   
D Activism Policy  1  -8%    -5%    10%    -6%   
D In-House Research  1  -2%    5%    10%    -5%   
Fund Characteristics                   
Size  1 SD (2.2)  -1%  2%    -8%  2%    -1%   
Age Old  1 SD (5.3)  3%    -1%  1%  -2%  0%  0.5%  0% 
Age Young  1 SD (5.3)  3%  1%  -4%  5%  -4%    3%   
Total Fees Low  1%  4%    7%    4%  2%     
Total Fees High  1%      5%  5%  3%  1%    1% 
Risk  1 SD (2.2%)  9%  10%  8%  9%  -7%  2%     
Average Return  1%  0.5%  2%  1%  4%  -1%  1%  0.5%  2 
Fund Family                   
D Top Performer Family  1      4%  5%      2%  1% 
Number Funds Family  1 SD (4.2)  2%    -1%  -0.5%  -2%       
D Market Leader Family  1  -1%    -6%  6%  6%  2%  1%   
Economic Condition                   
Interest Rate  1%  1%  6%    4%  3%  -1%  -2%  -3% 
Dividend Yield  1%    -15%  10%  -13%  -7%  -13%  4%  6% 
Term Structure Premium  1%    3%  5%  9%  -2%  7%  -1%   
Credit Risk Premium  1%  5%  3%  -9%  20%  7%  21%    -5% 
Int. Diversification                   
D European Diversif.  1  13%  -6%  -8%  -2%  -13%      -6% 
D Global Diversif.  1  -9%  -10%  -9%  -5%  -5%  13%  -2%  6% 
Geograph. Location                   
D Europe (ex. UK)  1      -18%    -13%    5%   
D US  1  11%    -25%    -4%    13%   
D Rest of World  1  -18%    -37%    7%    6%   
 